“公司里的公司”的组织解读——控股公司、集团公司的治理基础

控股公司、集团公司这类H型组织在市场经济占有较大比例,但目前还很少从理论上探讨其治理基础的文章。本文以委托-代理理论为基础,在构建分析模型的基础上,提出H型企业存在的根源是政府规制、有限责任制度,以及最重要的、有限理性条件下的信息不对称。     

Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countries

A key figure suited to measuring intergenerational imbalances in unfunded public pension schemes is given by the ‘implicit tax rate’ imposed on each generation's lifetime income. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits fall short of actuarial returns to contributions paid to these systems while actively working. Under current pension policies, implicit tax rates will increase sharply for younger generations in most industrialised countries. In this paper, this is illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their development over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to differences in ageing processes and in the institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we can demonstrate how effective different approaches to pension reform are in smoothing the intergenerational profile of implicit tax rates.     

Child labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in South Africa

Forward looking, unconstrained households make child labor and schooling decisions considering their permanent income and weighing the relative returns to child time in various potential activities. The timing of anticipated changes in income should have no effect on child labor and schooling in a setting where households can borrow against permanent income. However, this study documents large increases in schooling attendance and declines in total hours worked when black South African families become eligible for fully anticipatable social pension income. As an explanation, the data are most consistent with liquidity constraints for black elder males forcing rural families into less schooling for boys than they would choose absent the constraint, perhaps because of schooling costs.     

VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms

Little progress has been made toward understanding the relative performance of the two mechanisms most widely used for fundraising: the Voluntary Contribution (VCM) and Provision Point (PPM) mechanisms. This paper provides direct comparisons of the relative performance of variants of the VCM and PPM as they are most commonly implemented in the field. The research makes use of 1296 individual observations from 721 subjects, including 40 observations from a field experiment. A meta-analysis of the determinants of contribution levels and bootstrap estimates of the relative efficiency of the two mechanisms provide novel analyses of public goods experimental data. Overall, the PPM is found to increase total contributions, to be more responsive to changes in induced value, and to be generally more efficient than the VCM. For public goods with a benefit-cost ratio in the interval [1, 1.4), however, the VCM captures a greater portion of available benefits than the PPM.     

The role of buyer power in oligopoly models: An empirical study

This study investigates whether an industry's profitability and concentration are influenced by structural characteristics of the industries and final markets to which it sells. Very few similar studies have been made, and there is some dispute about their conclusions. This study discusses the methodological problems behind this dispute and the ways in which the specification and data used here avoid these problems. The results show that seller profitability rises with the extent to which buyers are dispersed across many industries, but that no other buyer characteristic exerts a significant influence on either the profitability or the concentration of the selling industry.     

Removing Homeownership Bias in Taxation: The Distributional Effects of Including Net Imputed Rent in Taxable Income

The income tax systems of most countries entail a favourable treatment of homeownership, compared to rental‐occupied housing. Such ‘homeownership bias’ and its consequences for a wide range of economic outcomes have long been recognised in the economic literature. Although a removal of the homeownership bias is generally advocated on efficiency grounds, its distributional implications are often neglected, especially in a cross‐country perspective. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by investigating the first‐order effects, in terms of distribution of income and work incentives, of removing the income tax provisions favouring homeownership. We consider six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK – that exhibit important variation in terms of income tax treatment of homeowners. Using the multi‐country tax benefit model EUROMOD, we analyse the distributional consequences of including net imputed rent in the taxable income definition that applies in each country, together with the removal of existing special tax treatments of incomes or expenses related to the main residence; thus, we provide a measure of the homeownership bias. We implement three tax policy scenarios. In the first, imputed rent is included in the taxable income of homeowners, while at the same time existing mortgage interest tax relief schemes and taxation of cadastral incomes are abolished. In the two further revenue‐neutral scenarios, the additional tax revenue raised through the taxation of imputed rent is redistributed to taxpayers, through either a tax rate reduction or a tax exemption increase. The results show how including net imputed rent in the tax base might affect inequality in each of the countries considered. Housing taxation appears to be a promising avenue for raising additional revenues, or lightening taxation of labour, with no inequality‐increasing side effects.     

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

Abstract. We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.     

An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government

Endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents, each enjoying some degree of autonomy. In this paper, policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and the agent at the other tier. Our results concerning multi-tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one-tier lobbying. In particular, the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies. Moreover, the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier. It is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight. Extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures, like federations or firms.     

The tradeoff between growth and equity in decentralization policy: China's experience

This paper investigates the potential tradeoff between economic growth and regional equity in the design of fiscal decentralization policy in the context of China's experience. We develop a theoretical model of fiscal decentralization, where overall national economic growth and equity in the regional distribution of fiscal resources are the two objectives pursued by the central government. The model is tested using panel data for 1985–98. We find that fiscal decentralization in China has led to economic growth as well as to significant increases in regional inequality.     

A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform

To understand reasons for possible failures of ‘good’ economic reforms, we consider an institution which is always successful in making the best public decision from the utilitarian perspective. We show it is bound to introduce inequality if costs of a reform are privately known: the losers can not be always compensated. Thus, if equity is a primary concern, then some reforms with positive aggregate net gain might not be undertaken. If the utilitarian welfare is the only guide for making public decisions, implementing a reform might require the ability to ignore the associated social costs of inequality.