Accrual accounting and Australian fiscal policy

Australian governments have recently moved from cash accounting to accrual accounting. Accrual accounting has been accompanied at the national government level by the introduction of a new key fiscal policy measure: the ‘fiscal balance’. This paper explains and evaluates this new fiscal measure. It concludes that, given the present fiscal policy of the Australian government, fiscal balance is a superior fiscal policy measure to the ‘cash’ budget balance measure which it replaced. However, from the alternative ‘golden rule’ policy standpoint, fiscal balance is not a meaningful fiscal policy measure — although its stock counterpart, net financial liabilities, certainly is.     

An Economic Analysis of the UK Landfill Permits Scheme

The UK will introduce in 2004 a system of tradable permits for the landfill of municipal waste, in response to an EU directive setting limits on such activity. Tradable permits are becoming an increasingly popular method of dealing with some environmental issues — for example, sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions in the USA. This paper describes the background to the landfill proposals and provides an analysis of how the permit system might work. Estimates are made of the possible savings in compliance costs of a permit system compared with a conventional ‘command–and–control’ approach. These estimates are subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty, related to factors discussed in the paper.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in High‐Income OECD Countries

Among the majority of high–income OECD countries, the degree of fiscal decentralisation has converged over the last 30 years towards an intermediate level. The theoretical arguments for and against fiscal decentralisation point to explanations for this tendency, because both extreme decentralisation and extreme centralisation are associated with disadvantages for economic growth. Hence, the observed trend of convergence would be growth–promoting. The paper analyses the long–run empirical relationship between per capita economic growth, capital formation and total factor productivity growth, and fiscal decentralisation for the high–income OECD countries. The evidence supports the view that the relationship is positive when fiscal decentralisation is increasing from low levels, but then reaches a peak and turns negative. A policy implication is that policy–makers in several countries with relatively low degrees of fiscal decentralisation could possibly mobilise growth reserves by increasing it.     

Fertility,Taxation and Family Policy*

Historically, there is clear evidence of an inverse relationship between female labour supply and fertility. However, the relationship across countries is now positive. Countries like Germany and Italy, with the lowest fertility, also have the lowest female participation rates. This paper analyses the extent to which this can be explained by public policy, in particular taxation and the system of child support. The results suggest that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.     

氟硅酸泵的国产化实践

硅氟酸极具腐蚀性 ,考虑到经济性 ,2 0 #合金、哈氏合金、蒙乃尔等贵金属很少被选为泵材。由于橡胶、塑料等高分子材料具有很好的抗蚀性和一定的机械性能 ,且价格便宜 ,因此一般选用其作为泵体材料。我们通过分析、比较 ,成功选择国产氟硅酸泵替代国外进口泵 ,实现国产化。     

预防液化石油气储罐应力腐蚀的初探

液化石油气储罐在工业和人民生活中有着广泛的应用,探讨液化石油气中所含H2S腐蚀介质对储罐的应力腐蚀及预防措施显得非常重要。     

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001     

Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism

We consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value-increasing investments. While negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes. If the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not.     

A spatial tax harmonization model

Policies to harmonize value-added tax rates are controversial in the European Union. This paper formulates a multi-country model over a one-dimensional space as a non-cooperative Nash game, in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue, subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band. Then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates, tax revenues and the number of cross-border shoppers at Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location.     

Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the intertemporal budget constraint?

Time series related to fiscal and external deficits are commonly subjected to stationarity and cointegration tests to assess if the deficits are sustainable. Such tests are incapable of rejecting sustainability. The intertemporal budget constraint proves to be satisfied if either the debt series or the revenue and with-interest spending series are integrated of arbitrarily high order, i.e., stationary after differencing arbitrarily often. Revenues and spending do not have to be cointegrated. Rejections of low-order difference-stationarity and of cointegration are thus consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. Error-correction-type policy reaction functions are suggested as more promising for understanding deficit problems.