Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

基于EVA的股票期权激励机制探讨

在委托代理关系中，企业所有者和经营者的目标函数存在差异，由此产生代理成本，需要对经营者进行相应的激励。然而，基于传统业绩评价而实施的股票期权存在一些弊端。本文探索将股票期权嫁接到EVA（经济附加值）平台之上，提出了基于EVA的经理人股票期权激励方案，以期能更有效地解决激励问题。     

Annual report readability and corporate agency costs

Annual reports are the main sources of information for outside investors’ investment decisions and enable shareholders to supervise the management. Difficulties with the readability of these reports may therefore have serious consequences. Using 19,221 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between annual report readability and corporate agency costs, where readability is proxied by report file length and/or file size. We find that firms with better annual report readability experience lower agency costs, and the negative association between readability and agency costs is more pronounced in firms with higher external audit quality, internal control quality or analyst coverage. These results hold after several robustness checks. The positive effect of annual report readability is stronger in private firms than in state-owned enterprises, and becomes stronger after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. Readable annual reports can help in monitoring corporate insiders’ opportunistic behavior and thus reduce agency costs.     

战略采购的过程模型及其作用模式

基于交易成本／交易效益双边动态理论，本文发展了战略采购的过程模型，提出战略采购是一个由市场替代企业、优化网络节点、固化网络联结和整合网络能力四个环节构成的过程．目的是推动企业和市场向网络变迁以获得交易成本的持续降低和交易收益的持续创造。文中还指出了不同条件下的战略采购作用机理。在买方优势条件下．采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展单联网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展并联网络来实现；在供方优势条件下，采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展外拓网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展外联网络来实现。最后，根据我国战略采购实践和理论现状提出提高我国战略采购水平的对策和进一步理论研究的建议。     

文化因素对企业经营绩效影响的研究

本文利用霍夫斯塔德（Hofstede）和他的同事跨文化研究的相关成果，结合新制度经济学的交易成本分析工具，对文化因素与企业经营绩效的关系进行了理论研究．并利用1995年世界最大500家公司的面板数据等．对文化因素与企业经营绩效的关系进行了计量检验，结果显示，个人主义与集体主义、权力距离和合作性三个文化因素对企业经营绩效有显著的影响。在此基础上．本文分析了文化因素对我国企业经营绩效的影响．并提出了相关的政策建议．     

利益相关者合作的税收征纳关系构建

在分析利益相关者税收行为长期偏好的基础上,建立了税收征纳利益相关者的博弈模型,提出了建立由税收征纳利益关系者共同承担监管成本和分享监管收益的机制,促进纳税人内部控制制度的完善和培育与内部利益相关者的合作,加强对会计行业的监管,完善会计行业的监管框架和审计咨询相分离的从业原则,协调利益相关者集体理性与个体理性之间的矛盾,建立和谐税收征纳体制。     

Estimation of investment costs in fish processing plants

Investment costs for fish processing plants are hereby presented along with a detailed analysis of different types of processes in relation to economies of scale.The cost-capacity factor for fish industry is estimated as 0.84, except for fish meal plants where the cost-capacity factor is 0.61.It is also discussed how technology, capacity and location in developed and developing countries can affect investment costs for fish processing plants, while cost-capacity factors remain unchanged.The concept of minimum limit for industrial capacity is included. Investment costs for minimum size plants or plants below minimum size are even greater than what would correspond to the correlation line. This is due to the need to incorporate one or more oversized pieces of equipment.     

The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.     

Lumpy Investment and Corporate Tax Policy

In the presence of both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment costs in a dynamic general equilibrium model, corporate tax policy generates both intensive and extensive margin effects via the channel of marginal Q. Its impact is determined largely by the strength of the extensive margin effect, which, in turn, depends on the cross‐sectional distribution of firms. Depending on the initial distribution of firms, the economy displays asymmetric responses to tax changes. Moreover, an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment and adjustment rate initially.