Industrial land price between China’s Pearl River Delta and Southeast Asian regions: Competition or Coopetition?

The planned economy system’s previous form of industrial land market control in China has led to current market failure because of a large amount of industrial land being sold at a very low price, causing extensive overuse of land and negative effects on land management. As the “World Factory”, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) is well known for its rapid urbanization largely driven by Foreign Direct Investment in labor-intensive industries. A low-land price strategy has been commonly adopted by the local government in order to attract industrial investment. In the past decade, the PRD has increasingly faced the increasing competition from its neighboring competition from its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia that have established preference policies to attract FDI and foreign enterprises. Despite a growing body of literature on the internal forces of industrial land in China, little is known of the external forces involved except for the importance of FDI and the intensity of interregional competition between China and other countries in attempting to attract foreign investment. This research fills the knowledge gap by modeling the situation in the form of an international cooperative game model aimed at revealing the industrial land price formation mechanism between the PRD region and Southeast Asian regions. The conditions of industrial land in the area and several Southeast Asian countries are first analyzed for their industrial land price movements in recent years. A game theoretic model is then built that exhibits similar characteristics. The result indicates that the governments’ low land price strategy and the competition between the PRD and its neighboring countries have created unnecessarily high social and environmental costs. Policy suggestions are made to encourage a more appropriate use of industrial land in China, and the most important being the need for a mindset shift from competition towards coopetition between the PRD and Southeast Asian regions.     

Behavioral determinants of supply chain integration and coexistence

Economic theory considers physical production characteristics and related property rights as key determinants of the organization of an industry. Yet, we frequently observe coexisting governance modes within industries and firms, even when the transaction attributes of a commodity are homogenous. We test whether risk and time preferences, price expectations, and trust in supply chain types can explain variations and coexistence in governance. Specifically, we experimentally elicit economic preferences of forest managers in the Swiss wood sector. We find that all behavioral dimensions are related to the choice of sales channel. Most importantly, trust and expectations are key determinants in transferring property rights, while risk aversion, patience, and ownership structure explain the existence of plural forms at the firm level.     

城市群产业结构与分工的测度研究——以辽中南城市群为例

城市群产业结构分工及状况如何会必然直接影响其发育程度及其国际竞争力,因此科学合理测度城市群产业结构与分工程度,具有十分重要的实践意义。运用区位熵灰色关联分析方法研究辽中南城市群2009年产业结构与分工状态,得出结论:①宏观层次上,辽中南城市群产业结构总体相似程度较高,产业结构地域分工不明确;②中观层次上,城市群各城市产业结构趋同现象虽然明显,但产业的地域分工已经开始显现;③不同产业与辽中南城市群的相似程度不同。通过上述研究,以期在实践上为辽中南城市群的产业结构调整提供参考意见。     

基于SWOT-AHP的工业仓储用岛开发利用策略研究——以舟山群岛新区为例

本文采用SWOT分析法对舟山工业仓储用岛开发利用的优势、劣势、机遇和挑战进行定性分析,再通过AHP法进行定量分析,构建SWOT-AHP模型。通过计算舟山工业仓储用岛开发利用策略四边形,确定舟山工业仓储用岛开发利用应选择开拓型战略,即发挥自身优势、抓住外部机遇。     

高新技术企业对外直接投资区位选择研究——基于产业集群的视角

高新技术产业集群具有明显的区位优势并逐渐成为高新技术企业对外直接投资区位选择的新取向,高新技术企业也只有真正嵌入集群网络中,才能更好地获取集群创新资源.深入探究基于产业集群的高新技术企业对外直接投资区位选择问题,对于我国高新技术企业的发展具有重要的理论与实践意义.     

企业技术创新内部达尔文主义发展历史的比较研究

运用案例分析法和比较分析法,对高科技企业技术创新内部达尔文主义产生的背景、历史发展进程及各阶段特征等问题进行了尝试性研究。     

中烟工业公司信息系统整合后的基础数据编码管理研究

中烟工业公司对下属生产厂的各类信息系统集成整合后,需构建独立于业务系统的基础数据编码管理平台和交换通道,实现编码的动态管理和与应用系统同步,将其格式定义、业务审核、变更管理、数据发布等处理内容的操作固化,保证编码在各应用系统中的唯一性、一致性。     

CDIO模式下工业设计专业《电子电工》课程改革探索

本文从工业设计专业的特点出发,分析了目前工业设计专业《电子电工》课程教学的现状,指出了该课程教学改革的必要性与重要性。借五邑大学为全国CDIO工程教育试点单位的契机,提出了CDIO模式下该校工业设计专业《电子电工》课程改革的思路和方法,并进行了探索性实践。     

Statistics Research at Bell Labs in the Regulated Monopoly Era

Industrial research in the United States took hold and grew during much of the 20th century. Bell Labs, a corporate component of the Bell System, was perhaps the premier example. The period from 1925, when Bell Labs was formed, to 1984, when the Bell System was broken up following a government antitrust lawsuit, is of special interest because the system operated as a regulated monopoly during that period. Telephone subscribers effectively paid for research and development in their monthly phone bills, which provided an element of financial stability for the labs. Statistics research was one of many types that thrived, much to the benefit of the Bell System, its customers, and the science of statistics. The purpose of this article is to review, explain, and illustrate the circumstances that contributed to this success and to raise the question of how modern corporations, operating in fully competitive environments, might achieve some of the same benefits.     

《工业工程基础》课程的有效性分析

从培养大学生发现问题与解决问题的能力入手,基于案例教学,结合现代IE的特点,提出了工业工程基础课程教学的一些新想法,同时对课堂教学进行了探索,以其提高教学效果。