Analysts' Forecasts and the Broker Relationship

Analysts' ability to forecast earnings per share has been the subject of considerable debate. A concern highlighted in previous research is the agency problem which may arise when analysts have a close working relationship with the firms for which they are providing forecasts. This paper provides evidence that this relationship does not improve the accuracy of the earnings forecasts, but stimulates optimistic forecasts. In addition, the paper examines whether firm size is a factor in forecast accuracy or bias.     

"上证"A股市场情绪的关键影响因素

文章从投资者认知偏误视角,研究提出了"上证"A股市场情绪的四维量表,系统整合了18个关键影响因素,形成中国证券市场情绪的关键影响因素概念模型.采用"上证"A股市场中152家企业的调研数据,进行验证性因子分析和拟合优度检验.结果表明,12个理论因素按预期模式加载,形成了认知偏误、有限套利、交互传染和本土特性等四个维度,对认识中国证券投资者的决策行为具有一定指导意义.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

On estimating the reliability after sequentially estimating the mean: The exponential case

Sequential estimation problems for the mean parameter of an exponential distribution has received much attention over the years. Purely sequential and accelerated sequential estimators and their asymptotic second-order characteristics have been laid out in the existing literature, both for minimum risk point as well as bounded length confidence interval estimation of the mean parameter. Having obtained a data set from such sequentially designed experiments, the paper investigates estimation problems for the associatedreliability function. Second-order approximations are provided for the bias and mean squared error of the proposed estimator of the reliability function, first under a general setup. An ad hoc bias-corrected version is also introduced. Then, the proposed estimator is investigated further under some specific sequential sampling strategies, already available in the literature. In the end, simulation results are presented for comparing the proposed estimators of the reliability function for moderate sample sizes and various sequential sampling strategies.     

Nonresponse Bias and Stimulus Effects in the Dutch National Election Study

Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias.     

Rock Paper Scissors

Rock Paper Scissors is used to resolve conflict when a compromise is not possible. Individuals playing ``games' tend to have biases they prefer to play. I show that Rock Paper Scissors with biased players results in a player with a high valuation for winning being victorious with a probability greater than a player with a low valuation. Thus, it frequently achieves the efficient outcome. Furthermore, as the benefit to victory increases for all players, victory for each player becomes equally likely. Therefore, it is often efficient for minor conflicts while it performs no better than a coin-flip for major conflicts.      

Behind closed doors: Sex bias at professional and managerial levels

U.S. companies have made important strides in combating sex discrimination in the workplace over the last two decades, but more subtle forms of sex bias still exist, often in decisions and behaviors that occur behind closed doors. This paper focuses on sex bias at professional and managerial levels. It explores sources of sex bias in the informal culture, selection and recruitment, task assignment, performance appraisal, promotion, and salary allocation, and then suggests action steps to help reduce sex bias in each of these areas.     

Two–step sequential sampling

Choosing the sample size in advance is a familiar problem: often, additional observations appear to be desirable. The final sample size then becomes a random variable, which has rather serious consequences.
Two such sample extension situations will be considered here. In the first situation, the observed sample variance determines whether or not to double the original sample size. In the second situation, the variances observed in two independent samples are compared; their ratio determines the number of additional observations.     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.