China's health care reform: A tentative assessment

China has recently unveiled an ambitious new health-care reform plan, entailing a doubling of government health spending as well as a number of concrete reforms. While the details of the plan have not yet been completely announced, we offer a preliminary assessment of how well the reform is likely to achieve its stated goal of assuring every citizen equal access to affordable basic health care. The reform is based on three fundamental tenets: strong role of government in health, commitment to equity, and willingness to experiment with regulated market approaches. Within this framework, the reform offers a number of laudable changes to the health system, including an increase in public health financing, an expansion of primary health facilities and an increase in subsidies to achieve universal insurance coverage. However, it fails to address the root causes of the wastes and inefficiencies plaguing China's health care system, such as a fragmented delivery system and provider incentives to over-provide expensive tests and services. We conclude that China should consider changing the provider payment method from fee-for-service to a prospective payment method such as DRG or capitation with pay-for-performance, and to develop purchasing agencies that represent the interests of the population so as to enhance competition.     

Mixed up? that’s good for motivation

We show that career concerns can arise in the absence of ex ante uncertainty about an agent’s type, if his unobservable actions influence future productivity. Implementing effort in mixed strategies allows the principal to endogenously introduce uncertainty about the agent’s ex post productivity and generate reputational incentives. Creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal, even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This finding for an environment with imperfect commitment contrasts with standard agency models, where implementing mixed strategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies can also be implemented.     

Procurement auctions with entry of bidders

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry. We show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry, commitment to a plain, nondistortive auction is optimal. In contrast, if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry, the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in Laffont and Tirole's static model.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

Does Trade,Technology, or Education Expel Traditional Sectors? Some Evidence from the Collapse of the Silk Sector in South Korea*

Rapid economic growth and development often drives out traditional activities. We determine how increased trade, technology, and access to education in South Korea led to the collapse of its silk sector. Results show that although the imports of silk yarn and fabric reduced domestic silk output and prices, trade liberalization was not the sole contributor to the collapse. Inelastic labor demand for unskilled workers, skill‐biased technology, and especially increased access to education all led to a sharp rise in the relative wage of unskilled workers, and the ensuing rise in production costs contributed to the silk sector's collapse.     

Incentive Travel: A View from the Top

Meetings, incentives, conventions, and exhibitions are an important segment of the hospitality and tourism industry. The extant study focuses on the incentives or incentive travel. While incentive travel has existed for decades it is a relatively under-researched sub-field of hospitality. The goal of this article is to examine the current state of incentive travel, how it has changed over the past few years, and how it is likely to change in the future. Rather than examine every aspect of incentive travel, this research only looks at “buyers” of incentive travel rather than users or recipients and obtains data only from top-level corporate executives. Thus, the results are of the highest level and highest caliber. It was found that companies have been using incentive travel for decades and find it to be an effective employee motivator and as an incentive to sell product. It also builds morale and relationships.     

解决农民工工资拖欠问题的思考

本文认为,近年来我国农民工工资拖欠问题日益严重,已成为影响劳动关系和谐发展乃至社会稳定的重要因素。当前解决农民工工资拖欠问题的模式主要有两大类,即行政机关采取行政手段的讨薪模式和劳动仲裁委员会及司法机关采取劳动仲裁和法律诉讼手段的讨薪模式,这些模式都存在一定的缺陷。考虑到工会在解决农民工工资拖欠问题方面的优势,应完成工会从行政化向市场化的转型,创新工会工作方式,赋予工会运用有利于开展工作的法律手段的权力,通过工会加强和提高农民工自身力量,从而形成解决农民工工资拖欠问题的长效机制。     

论开放经济中的战略性贸易政策:一个基于国际租金耗散的分析框架

传统的战略性贸易政策理论是建立在封闭经济基础上的。本文力图把开放经济中的国际租金耗散问题纳入到分析框架之中,通过研究表明此时战略性贸易政策严格弱。同时由于利润转移政策的外溢效应,两国政府有进行串谋的激励。     

Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Cooperative Norms, and Codes of Business Ethics

Prisoner's dilemmas can lead rational people to interact in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies. These dilemmas create a problem for institutional designers to solve: devise institutions that realign individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes. I will argue that we do not always want to eliminate misalignments between individual incentives and efficient outcomes. Sometimes we want to preserve prisoner's dilemmas, even when we know that they systematically will lead to inefficiencies. No doubt, prisoner's dilemmas can create problems, but they also create opportunities to practice the cooperative norms that make market institutions possible in the first place. An ethical market culture, I argue, benefits from the presence of prisoner's dilemmas. I first consider standard approaches for solving prisoner's dilemmas. I then argue for the value of prisoner's dilemmas. Finally, I show the significance of this argument for advocating codes of business ethics.     

效率工资利与弊

效率工资理论是新凯恩斯主义劳动市场理论中的一个重要的理论 ,是宏观经济学在最近 2 0年取得的进展之一。进入 2 1世纪 ,有关效率工资的文献仍层出不穷 ,而企业在实行效率工资时仍然会出现一些问题。鉴于此 ,根据效率工资的基本模型 ,分析实行效率工资的利弊 ,并给出建议