Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

上市公司资产减值方向信息含量研究——来自沪深两市2003年的经验证据

我国新颁布的《企业会计准则第8号——资产减值》规定,存货等已确认的资产减值不得转回。针对新准则对资产减值单向计提的规定,本文从资产减值准备计提方向研究上市公司资产减值的信息含量,发现资产减值的计提方向存在信号显示作用。这表明资产减值准备方向传递了公司未来前景的信息,全面取缔资产减值准备的转回将减少资产减值的部分信息含量。     

非对称信息下企业信用风险形成机理及其降低策略

信用风险控制既是风险控制研究的理论难点，也是风险控制实践的难点。从非对称信息理论的角度出发。分析非对称信息下信用风险形成的机理，可以得出控制信用风险的关键在于事前阶段的结论。加强客户信用信息管理系统的建设是企业降低信用风险的关键，也是实现企业信用风险标本兼治的第一步。     

信息管理与信息系统学科建设的现状和设想

经济信息管理专业和管理信息系统专业在国内开办已20多年了，经济几代人的努力，专业建设有了很大的发展，但是，该专业的特色和优势还不明显，现在更是受到计算机科学与技术专业，电子商务专业的两面夹击，专业的发展空间和生存空间受到了严重的挑战，因此，必须重新构建信息管理与信息系统专业的框架，并科学定位。     

公司治理与会计信息质量控制

简要分析了公司治理结构与会计信息质量的关系,并在借鉴国外公司治理经验的基础上,结合中国企业的实际情况,从公司股权结构、公司治理模式、独立董事制度、股票期权激励约束机制以及绩效评价体系等有关公司治理的五个方面提出了若干建议和设想。     

企业网络财务信息披露调查与分析——来自河北省的案例

网上获取财务信息是管理者和投资者获取信息的主要途径之一,本文选取河北省上市为样本企业调查了企业网上财务信息的披露情况。调查发现,绝大部分企业建立了自己的网站,但普遍存在网上财务信息披露水平不高、财务信息披露量参差不齐、披露形式单一、对信息的安全性重视不足、数据更新不及时等问题,针对这些问题提出了改进建议。