The e-integration dilemma: The linkages between Internet technology application, trading partner relationships and structural change

The evidence from an empirical study involving 281 Australian organizations suggests that the availability, open nature, and (comparative) ease of implementation of Internet technologies for integration with trading partners, whilst on the one hand providing the means by which organizations can integrate processes and systems in a cost effective way, can amplify the need for both structural change and closer collaboration with trading partners. The relationships proposed and tested in the model are justified and explained based on a number of theoretical perspectives. These include Transaction Cost Economics, Socio-technical Systems, Resource Dependency, Knowledge Based View, Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Learning. The implications of the findings for Transaction Cost Theory are noteworthy firstly because they support the appropriateness of the inter-organizational governance structure in the context of this study, and secondly because although application of these technologies may reduce information search and related costs, whether this necessarily leads to reduced coordination costs is problematic. The potential benefits from improved coordination may be constrained by the perceived costs, and risks, of transition to new structural forms. The implication for practice is that increased use of Internet technologies creates substantial pressure to invest in organizational change. The attractiveness of investing in technologies that place managers in a position where they need to promote organizational change in order to extract adequate returns creates a significant dilemma. On the one hand Internet technologies enable extensive sharing and integration of data among trading partners, but at the same time they create conditions requiring managers to embrace fundamental organizational change in order to leverage the potential of such integration.     

外生冲击与房地产真实价格波动--对1998～2003年中国31省(市、区)的实证研究

文章首先根据经济学模型界定了两个重要指标:自相关系数与收敛系数.认为不同的外生冲击对这两个系数有不同的影响,而它们决定了房地产真实价格波动形态的差异.在此基础上,文章利用1998～2003年中国31个省(市、区)的面板数据对中国房地产市场进行了实证研究,其结论是,在真实人均可支配收入和真实建筑成本较高、真实税后住宅抵押贷款利率较低的地区有较大的自相关系数和较小的收敛系数,从而房地产真实价格具有更大的波动性.为使房地产真实价格在均衡价格附近平稳运行,降低开发成本和提高消费者购买成本能收到较好的效果.     

Can oil shocks explain asymmetries in the US Business Cycle?

We consider whether oil prices can account for business cycle asymmetries. We test for asymmetries based on the Markov switching autoregressive model popularized by Hamilton (1989), using the tests devised by Clements and Krolzig (2000). We find evidence against the conventional wisdom that recessions are more violent than expansions: while some part of the downturn in economic activity that characterises recessionary periods can be attributed to dramatic changes in the price of oil, post-War US economic growth is characterized by the steepness of expansions. First Version Received: December 2000/Final Version Received: September 2001     

Learning by doing,spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers.JEL Classification: L11, L13, O31Correspondence to: Michael TroegeWe would like to thank Hans Mewis, Christophe Moussu and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of seminar participants at WZB, Humboldt University, Northwestern University and the EEA/ESEM 1999 meetings. Part of the research was carried out while Michael Tröge was visiting Northwestern University. Financial support by the German Research Council (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Contests with spying: A comment

The subject of the following comment is a paper by Baik and Shogren which has been published in this journal (Vol. 11, No. 3 (1995) pp. 441–451). In their game-theoretic model, Baik and Shogren connect the informational states of the agents in a way which leads to inconsistencies.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

Wealth and sustainable development: the role of David Pearce

Green net national product was thought to be one way of measuring sustainable income. However, David Pearce understood that a better measure of sustainable development was to look at what a generation is leaving in form of capital assets to later generations. In this article, his arguments and insights are highlighted against recent theoretical advances.     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.