“一带一路”框架下的中拉绿色产品贸易:特征、比较优势与出口潜力

在“双循环”背景下,加强“一带一路”建设对中国深化对外开放意义重大,促进中拉绿色贸易符合双方利益,可为“一带一路”延伸至拉美创造新的合作增长点。本文使用2002年至2018年的货物贸易数据,分析了中拉共建“一带一路”过程中中拉绿色产品贸易的特征和趋势,并重点研究了中国绿色产品对拉美的出口潜力。通过使用双边显示性比较优势指数和出口潜力矩阵,文章发现,在现有的中拉货物贸易结构中,绿色产品贸易所占比重较低,贸易对象高度集中,但随着双方经贸合作的全面深化、特别是“一带一路”延伸至拉美,双边绿色产品贸易金额和种类都在稳定上升。尽管中国绿色产品在拉美市场面临着地理距离遥远、市场竞争激烈等客观困难,但中国的优势产品已成功出口到拉美。中国的出口潜力更多地取决于拉美地区的市场需求,一旦拉美对绿色产品的需求提升,那么中国就具备进一步扩大向拉美出口该类产品的潜力。此外,出口潜力矩阵也找出了部分对拉美市场而言具备不可替代性的中国产品,这也将成为中国潜在的对拉出口重点绿色产品。     

Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

Evaluating Projects and Assessing Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies

We are interested in three related questions:(1) How should accounting prices be estimated?(2) How should we evaluate policy change in animperfect economy? (3) How can we check whetherintergenerational well-being will be sustainedalong a projected economic programme? We do notpresume that the economy is convex, nor do weassume that the government optimizes on behalfof its citizens. We show that the same set ofaccounting prices should be used both forpolicy evaluation and for assessing whether ornot intergenerational welfare along a giveneconomic path will be sustained. We also showthat a comprehensive measure of wealth,computed in terms of the accounting prices, canbe used as an index for problems (2) and (3)above. The remainder of the paper is concernedwith rules for estimating the accounting pricesof several specific environmental naturalresources, transacted in a few well knowneconomic institutions.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.     

上市公司资产减值方向信息含量研究——来自沪深两市2003年的经验证据

我国新颁布的《企业会计准则第8号——资产减值》规定,存货等已确认的资产减值不得转回。针对新准则对资产减值单向计提的规定,本文从资产减值准备计提方向研究上市公司资产减值的信息含量,发现资产减值的计提方向存在信号显示作用。这表明资产减值准备方向传递了公司未来前景的信息,全面取缔资产减值准备的转回将减少资产减值的部分信息含量。