Econometric analysis of copyrights

This paper explores the impact of copyrights on firm value and on the demand for firm output. Using panel data on franchise value and ticket sales from the National Football League over the 1991–2000 period, we analyze the effect of copyrights (in this case, team logos) using several parametric estimators, the Arellano and Bond [1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277–297] dynamic panel data estimator, and a semi-non-parametric method based on difference-in-differences propensity score matching. We find a negative effect of logo changes on franchise value that is robust across multiple specifications. In addition, logo changes also appear to have a moderate positive, albeit not particularly robust, impact on ticket sales.     

浅析多媒体技术在车辆工程教学中的应用

随着教育的发展 ,传统的教学方法已不能满足时代的需要 ,亟待运用现代教育技术手段 ,特别是多媒体的教学形式进入课堂 ,以发挥其特有的功能来提高学习效率。本文浅淡了如何在车辆工程教学中运用计算机多媒体的图、文、声、像并茂的特点 ,有效的激发学生的学习兴趣。     

我国扶贫历程及其探索

我国扶贫工作在改革开放以后经历了三个阶段,今后扶贫工作面临新的挑战.根据我国扶贫工作需要,结合当前社区建设的发展,应采取农村社区扶贫这一扶贫方式,把扶贫开发与农村社区建设结合起来.     

跨文化词义的比较与翻译

词汇是语言符号和体言中的最小的有意义的语言载体,对跨文化词义的社会性、文化性、民族化、地理环境和喻体相异性、习俗的文化意义等进行比较,有助于跨文化翻译.采用异化法、异化解释法、归化法、归化意译法等方法,将翻译置于跨文化交际中进行,以达到跨文化交际中的文化效应最大近似或对应.     

加强和改进"两课"教学工作的探索和实践

"两课"是对大学生进行思想政治教育的主渠道和主阵地.我校重视加强和改进"两课"教学工作,推进"两课"建设和教学改革,形成"两课"教学的五个明显特色,促进了学生思想政治素质的提高和全面素质的发展.面对新形势、新任务、新要求,应发扬成绩,克服不足,进一步加强和改进"两课"教学工作.     

川渝毗邻地区合作示范区协同发展研究 ———基于哈肯模型的实证分析

摘 要：本文将川渝毗邻地区合作共建区域发展功能平台统称为川渝毗邻地区合作示范区（以下简称“示范区”）,并以此为研究对象,通过泰尔L指数,测度示范区经济发展差异,随后运用哈肯模型、耦合协调和灰色关联度等方法进行协调度分析。研究发现,各示范区经济发展差异较小,经济发展趋同,加剧示范区之间的竞争,削弱协同合作,抑制比较优势的发挥和提升;成渝“双核”对示范区的辐射带动作用不明显,示范区总体与成渝“双核”的差距仍然较大;在示范区协同发展中,经济金融活动发挥着主导作用,经济环境与金融支持协调发展趋势向好,金融支持对示范区协同发展有显著的正向影响。基于此,建议大力发展新型金融业态,为优势产业发展营造良好的金融支持环境;开辟特色金融“试验区”,引入特色金融活水,有针对性地加强各示范区优势产业和特色产业的金融支持,进一步提升比较优势,强化示范区与成渝“双核”的经济联系,为成渝地区双城经济圈高质量发展提供重要支撑。     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy

The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.