Exchange risk and universal returns: A test of international arbitrage pricing theory

According to the international arbitrage pricing theory (IAPT) posited by Solnik (1983), currency movements affect assets' factor loadings and associated risk premiums. Based on a novel universal return decomposition, we propose an empirical model to test this proposition and perform tests using U.S. stock returns in the period 1975–2008. Our results confirm that currency movements significantly affect the market betas of a large proportion of stocks. Further cross-sectional tests indicate that currency movements affecting the market factor are significantly priced in stock returns. Based on these and other findings, we conclude that Solnik's IAPT is supported. An important implication of our findings is that exchange rate risk can broadly affect stock returns through both factor loading and residual factor channels.     

A historical overview of financial crises in the United States

One of the few constants since the United States declared its independence is the presence of frequent financial crises with similar causes. In the nineteenth century, these panics were frequent with eight occurring over the century. However, following the Second World War there was a period of relative calm, which may have led to complacency. The Savings and Loans and the current financial crises have shown that these events remain a very real threat to economic stability.     

The financial crisis: What is there to learn?

Many are currently studying the origins of the financial crisis in an attempt to answer two seemingly simple questions: why did it happen, and can another crisis be prevented? Those two questions have proved incredibly divisive. The majority opinion of The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was submitted with two dissenting positions. Furthermore, The 2010 Economic Report of the United States President does not perfectly align with any opinion presented in that report. Few studies, however, provide proper consideration to the evolution of macroeconomic thought and lengthening of the business cycle preceding the current crisis.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.     

Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and money flows of socially responsible investment funds

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.     

Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

I explore CEOs’ incentives to select firm strategies and to acquire firm-specific skills when CEOs have job-hopping opportunities. Several features of managerial compensation, such as benchmarking of pay to larger and more prestigious companies, payments unrelated to past performance, unrestricted stock awards for highly paid CEOs, long-term incentives, and higher pay in companies granting long-term incentives, emerge in the optimal contract. I argue that the model can explain the change in the structure and the surge in US CEO compensation as well as differences across countries and across firms within a country.     

A computing bias in estimating the probability of informed trading

This study identifies a factor that leads to a bias in estimating the probability of informed trading (PIN), a widely-used microstructure measure. It is shown that, along with the numerical maximization of the likelihood function for PIN, the floating-point exception (i.e., overflow or underflow) may eliminate feasible solutions to the actual parameters in the optimization problem. Approximately 44% of PIN estimates for recent stock market data may have been subject to a downward bias that is more pronounced for active stocks than for inactive stocks. This study develops a remedy to mitigate the resulting bias.     

Automation, speed, and stock market quality: The NYSE's Hybrid

Automation and trading speed are increasingly important aspects of competition among financial markets. Yet we know little about how changing a market's automation and speed affects the cost of immediacy and price discovery, two key dimensions of market quality. At the end of 2006 the New York Stock Exchange introduced its Hybrid Market, increasing automation and reducing the execution time for market orders from 10 seconds to less than one second. We find that the change raises the cost of immediacy (bid-ask spreads) because of increased adverse selection and reduces the noise in prices, making prices more efficient.     

Basel Core Principles and bank soundness: Does compliance matter?

This paper studies whether compliance with the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision (BCPs) is associated with bank soundness. Using data for over 3000 banks in 86 countries, we find that neither the overall index of BCP compliance nor its individual components are robustly associated with bank risk measured by individual bank Z-scores. We also fail to find a relationship between BCP compliance and systemic risk measured by a system-wide Z-score.     

Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

In the context of the proposed EU financial supervisory reforms, this paper focuses on the governance of the network of national supervisory banking agencies and the newly established Community supervisor (European Banking Authority, EBA). We assess to what extent lack of governance convergence nationally and with EBA could undermine the incentives for cooperation among supervisors. Convergence should particularly focus on (i) the issue of the presence of politicians on decision-making bodies; (ii) the need for clearly defining dismissal procedures of heads of supervision; (iii) autonomy from government in regulatory matters; (iv) supervisory autonomy in matters of licensing and withdrawing licenses; (iv) mechanisms for judicial accountability; (v) legal protection for supervisors handling in good faith. In the absence of full centralization of prudential supervision, early harmonization of national governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors’ incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the effectiveness of European supervision.