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41.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):903-905
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
42.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献
43.
We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there
is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for
a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable,
as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification
have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance,
which performance is not significantly different between them. 相似文献
44.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
45.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
46.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
47.
Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic
model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future
available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect
of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli
business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in
the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or
other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to
determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated
economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in
the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement
was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result
may not be true.
Correspondence to: B. Bental 相似文献
48.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
49.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
50.
The evidence presented in the paper rejects the twin deficit hypothesis for the Austrian current account balance during the
last two decades. The results are based on an estimate of a vector error correction model including quarterly data for the
current account balance and potentially relevant variables driving its dynamics. We compute the variance decomposition of
the current account's forecast error and its generalized impulse responses to shocks in the innovations of the system. The
results in favor of intertemporal expenditure reallocation cannot be reproduced within a second analysis including the current
account and a measure of net output, however. The estimated implicit current account balance, interpreted as the discounted
expected change in future net output, does not follow the actual behaviour of the current account.
First version received: June 1999/Final version received: March 2001 相似文献