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91.
Hiroyuki Nakata 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):697-727
Summary. This paper studies how communication or exchange of opinions influences correlation of beliefs. The paper focuses on a situation
in which agents communicate with each other infinitely many times without observing data. It is an extension to the ‘Expert
Problem’ in Bayesian theory, where the informational flow is asymmetric. Moreover, this paper generalizes the existing literature
of communication that employs the common prior assumption (CPA) by allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. Some basic convergence
results are shown in contrast with the results obtained under the CPA. Furthermore, several economic implications of the basic
results are provided.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge
the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject. Also, I appreciate comments from
Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Maurizio Motolese, Carsten K. Nielsen, Ho-Mou Wu and the anonymous referee. 相似文献
92.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
93.
Summary. All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects,
agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial
assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers
them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense,
and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.
Received: October 5, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2000 相似文献
94.
Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic
model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future
available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect
of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli
business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in
the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or
other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to
determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated
economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in
the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement
was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result
may not be true.
Correspondence to: B. Bental 相似文献
95.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
96.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
97.
The evidence presented in the paper rejects the twin deficit hypothesis for the Austrian current account balance during the
last two decades. The results are based on an estimate of a vector error correction model including quarterly data for the
current account balance and potentially relevant variables driving its dynamics. We compute the variance decomposition of
the current account's forecast error and its generalized impulse responses to shocks in the innovations of the system. The
results in favor of intertemporal expenditure reallocation cannot be reproduced within a second analysis including the current
account and a measure of net output, however. The estimated implicit current account balance, interpreted as the discounted
expected change in future net output, does not follow the actual behaviour of the current account.
First version received: June 1999/Final version received: March 2001 相似文献
98.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献
99.
中国现行失业保障面临重重困境,迫切要求探索失业保障的制度创新。针对实践中出现的新型失业保障模式,对政府—社会合作型失业保障体系的构建进行初步探讨,对于建立以政府主导的失业保险为基础,非营利组织失业救助为补充,政府、企业和非营利组织合作促进再就业,以社区作为政府—社会合作的结合部的失业保障体系具有一定的现实意义。 相似文献
100.
Frédéric Lordon 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):1-21
The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies,
and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing
that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
“productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path.
Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by
the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as
long term and endogenous outcomes. 相似文献