The Discriminating Beta: Prices and Capacity with Correlated Demands

Uniform customer‐class pricing can do much of the work of congestion‐based or time‐of‐day pricing in communication or wireless networks. A monopolist exploits differences in the stochastic characteristics of demands. If demands are correlated and the firm faces a capacity constraint, then it can set prices to reduce the variability of aggregate demand, thereby reducing the probability of excess demand and the associated service quality deterioration. Demands that covary negatively with aggregate demand are valuable to the firm in much the same way that securities that covary negatively with the market are valuable in a stock portfolio. Customer classes that exhibit low covariance with aggregate demand realize lower optimal prices. Optimal capacity is also affected by these covariances. As long as demands are not perfectly positively correlated, expected costs of joint production are less than expected costs of serving demands separately.     

The stained China miracle: Corruption,regulation, and firm performance

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.     

Location and ownership of public goods

We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.     

Health insurer market power and primary care consolidation

This paper analyzes how health insurance market concentration impacts the market structure of primary care physicians. In more concentrated insurance markets, physicians are found to work in larger practices and their practices are more likely to have a hospital with an ownership interest. Physicians are also less likely to report being in a competitive physician market, consistent with practice consolidation. Our results suggest that consolidation in insurance markets impacts the competitive structure of physician markets.     

Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).     

Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.     

Waiting for Signaling Quality

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying until the next period, with the hope of learning the unknown quality. I analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. I show when the monopolist offers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. I also find two types of separating equilibria: one where the high‐type monopolist signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low‐type monopolist in the first period and another where the high‐type monopolist announces the product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signaling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signaling device.     

Parallel trade,product quality,and welfare

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.     

新《行政诉讼法》有关判决方式的文本解读

新《行政诉讼法》关于行政诉讼判决方式的修改内容丰富、特色鲜明、亮点颇多,有必要在法治国家的背景下对其深入解读。新《行政诉讼法》的判决方式具有五大亮点,修订后的判决方式彰显了国家治理的法治现代化。对于新《行政诉讼法》有关判决方式的适用我们需要注意四个层面的内容。新《行政诉讼法》对判决方式的修订并不完美,但是瑕不掩瑜,通过这次修法,我国行政审判将会以判决方式的改变作为基点迎来发展的契机。     

Efficiency Determinants and Capacity Issues in Angolan Insurance Companies

This paper describes a variety of approaches used to assess the efficiency of a sample of major insurance companies in Angola between 2003 and 2012. Starting out with the bootstrapping technique, several data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimates were generated, allowing the use of confidence intervals and bias correction in central estimates to test for significant differences in efficiency levels and input‐decreasing/output‐increasing potentials. Previous studies have focused on the measurement and explanation of the factors affecting the performance rather than the prediction. The use of neural networks combined with DEA results as part of an attempt to produce a model for insurance companies’ performance with effective predictive ability is investigated. The findings indicate that older insurance companies with Portuguese origin tend to be more efficient. Results also suggest that opportunities for accommodating future demand appear to be scarce.