The regional wage gap in the Spanish hospitality sector based on a gender perspective

In this work we estimate human capital returns in the Spanish hospitality sector using an expanded version of the Mincer wage equation (1974). In addition, wage differences in the main tourist regions are quantified using the wage decomposition of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) from a gender perspective. Using data from the 2006 Spanish Wage Structure Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial), all the regions under analysis show lower education returns in the hospitality sector when compared to other private services. The same results are found for the other human capital variables used. There are significant differences in education returns between regions, especially in Catalonia and the Canary Islands. The main wage gap in the Canary Islands and the Madrid region is due to differences in returns in the observed variables, whereas in other regions most of the differences are due to the resources allocated. Furthermore, gender wage differences are found in all the regions. The largest estimated wage gap between men and women occurs in the Balearic Islands followed by Catalonia and the Community of Valencia. In contrast, equality between genders is greater in the Community of Madrid.     

Reforms,globalization, and endogenous agricultural structures

In this article, I draw lessons from two quasi‐natural experiments (the transition process in former Communist countries and the rapid globalization of food chains) on the optimality of farms and agricultural structures more generally. I argue that (a) the farm structures that have emerged from the transition process are much more diverse than expected ex ante; (b) this diversity is to an important extent determined by economic mechanisms which are influenced by initial conditions and reform policies; (c) non‐traditional farm structures have played an important role during transition because they were optimal to address the specific institutional and structural constraints imposed by the transition process; (d) there is more diversity than often argued in the farms that are integrated in global food chains; (e) endogenous institutional (contracting) innovations in food chains may lock existing farm structures in a long‐run institutional framework; and (f) indicators based on farm structures are not a good measure of welfare effects of the globalization of food chains.     

Payments for environmental services to promote “climate‐smart agriculture”? Potential and challenges

Payments for environmental services (PES) have gained wide popularity as approaches to promote environmentally friendly land use or agricultural production practices. Yet academics have also voiced concerns against seeing PES as a panacea. This article discusses whether PES is an appropriate and promising approach to promote so‐called “climate‐smart agriculture” (CSA) practices, which we define as agricultural production practices that contribute to CO₂ emission reductions and/or removals and provide benefits to farmers via increased productivity and profits and reduced vulnerability to climate change. PES appears most promising for the promotion of CSA practices in small‐scale farming contexts with low incomes. Effective design, however, requires solid estimates of cost and benefit flows from CSA adoption over time, accounting for differences in socioeconomic and ecological conditions, and addressing the risk of leakage. Funding for such PES will likely have to come from public sources, and seems most promising where synergies with other objectives such as agricultural development, food security, and climate adaptation or other environmental services exist. The potential of alternative approaches for CSA support such as taxation with rebates for CSA practices, CSA‐related investment support such as microcredits, and hybrid approaches such as conditional microcredit should be further investigated.     

Political objectives and privatization decisions

In early Romanian privatization a group of firms was explicitly banned from privatization. We use this institutional feature to test which factors contributed to the selection of firms for long‐term state ownership, and find that politicians sheltered from privatization large and inefficient firms which paid low wages and had high overdue payments. These results are consistent with minimization of employment losses, even if efficiency enhancement of privatization had to be sacrificed. We conjecture that the unfavourable economic conditions bringing large employment losses motivated Romanian politicians to fear the possible negative employment effects of privatization.     

Durable goods produced by state owned enterprises

A two-period durable-goods monopoly model is analyzed where the durable good is provided by a state owned enterprise (SOE). First, we suppose that the SOE is under pressure to provide employment, and therefore has an employment goal, as well as the traditional profit and consumer surplus objectives. Assuming that the SOE has difficulty committing to current buyers with respect to its profit and employment motives, we find that as the employment burden increases, the SOE tends to move further away from the efficient durability and provides a lower durability level than a pure profit maximizer. Additionally, we show that a durable-goods SOE without commitment power, will wish to partially privatize to help mitigate its commitment problem with buyers and increase social welfare. Both of these findings provide economic rationale for the partial privatization of SOEs in transitioning economies that have not been identified in the literature prior to this.     

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*

Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.     

Entry restrictions and the determination of quality

Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. This paper analyzes demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of this type of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and the welfare of its consumers. Selective increases in the costs of entry such as licensing requirements and direct restrictions with competitive bidding for entry rights are considered. We analyze the effects of these policies on entry decisions and also the additional selection effects that are obtained when exit is allowed for and the rights to participate in an industry can be freely traded.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.