Introduction to internally consistent modeling,aggregation, inference,and policy

This special issue of the Journal of Econometrics honors William A. Barnett’s exceptional contributions to unifying economic theory with rigorous statistical inference to interpret economic data and inform public policy. It is devoted to papers that advance microeconometrics, macroeconometrics, and financial econometrics to build models to interpret evidence.     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).     

The asymmetric effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade and offshoring decisions

This paper studies the effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade. Building on the Antràs and Helpman (2004) North–South theoretical framework, I show that higher Northern tariffs reduce the incentives for outsourcing and offshoring, while higher Southern tariffs have the opposite effects. I also show that increased offshoring and outsourcing imply a decrease in the ratio of Northern intra-firm imports to total imports, an empirically testable prediction. Using a highly disaggregated dataset of U.S. (the North) imports and relevant U.S. and foreign tariffs, I find robust evidence to support the model's predictions.     

Peer Effects among Swimmers

We develop a novel identification strategy and examine various aspects of peer effects using swimming data. We find that the performance of adjacent competitors positively influences swimmers' performances. In particular, swimmers are influenced by slower‐lane peers, suggesting that being chased improves one's performance. We use absenteeism data to directly compare the performances of swimmers with and without peers. We have found that swimmers swim faster with peers swimming behind them than when swimming alone, but that they swim slower with peers swimming ahead. Finally, we find that observability is a key determinant of peer effects, by comparing freestyle and backstroke competitions.     

Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.     

Predation and network based price discrimination in Chile

This paper uses a model of strategic interaction among firms –that set discriminatory and nonlinear prices– in addition to public information on prices of the plans marketed by the three major mobile phone companies, to assess the extent to which on-net/off-net price differentials in the plans they offered could represent predatory practices in the mobile telephony market in Chile. The results show that the largest companies offered a few plans with an off-net/on-net price differential larger than what a competitive theoretical model predicts. This larger differential is consistent with the notion of predation defined by Hoernig (2007) as reducing a competitor's profits. Despite the fact that these plans were a small fraction of all the plans mobile phone firms offered, they were recently banned by the antitrust authority because of their potential anticompetitive effects.     

Environmental–Economic Accounting: Progress and Digression in the SEEA Revisions

The 1992 Earth Summit and its message of sustainable development drove the launching of a System for integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting, the SEEA. Since then, sustainable development and the SEEA have given way to green growth and green economy indicators in the latest 2012 Summit. A lengthy revision process has now produced a curtailed “SEEA central framework.” The new framework focuses on expenditures for environmental protection and resource management, and stocks and flows of “economic” resources; both are covered by the conventional national accounts. Environmental degradation, notably from pollution, is left to “experimental” ecosystem accounts. Further revision of the SEEA should reverse this retrenchment from integrative environmental–economic accounting. A comprehensive satellite system, rather than a limited statistical standard, might put the SEEA back on the policy agenda.     

Waiting for Signaling Quality

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying until the next period, with the hope of learning the unknown quality. I analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. I show when the monopolist offers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. I also find two types of separating equilibria: one where the high‐type monopolist signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low‐type monopolist in the first period and another where the high‐type monopolist announces the product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signaling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signaling device.