Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

Assessing the impact of patent infringement on new product sales

In order to assess the impact of patent infringement on the growth of a new product, a model is developed through the intervention model development processes of Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao. Physical interpretations of model parameters and determination of associated damages suggest that the model can provide a sound basis for analyzing patent infringement disputes.     

银行信用证议付及其追索权的法学解读

在法学视角下，信用证议付实质上是议付银行向信用证受益人（出口商）给付价值后买入信用证项下的汇票和整套单据的法律行为。议付不同于出口押汇。议付是一种买卖汇票和单据的行为，而出口押汇是一种以单据为质押的融资行为。议付单据遭到开证银行拒付，议付银行有权对信用证受益人（出口商）行使追索权。议付银行的这种追索权既可以来自于合同条款的约定，也可以来自于票据法所赋予的请求权。     

Assessing French nursing home efficiency: An indirect approach via budget-constrained DEA models

In this paper, data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques are applied to the French nursing home industry in order to address two policy issues. The first involves nursing home size and returns to scale, while the second deals with the potential effects of a change in nursing home reimbursement from a flat rate to one based on the severity of case-mix. To accomplish this, our analysis expands on the existing nursing home literature to analyze technical and allocative efficiency along with budget-constrained models rather than the more common direct input-based distance function. Technical efficiency is evaluated via an indirect output distance function while allocative output efficiency is computed with a cost indirect revenue function. The findings suggest that system-wide efficiency and equity may result from coming reforms since payments would more accurately reflect resource use.     

Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.     

Critical factors in computing externalities for electricity resources

The New York State Environmental Externalities Cost Study and computerized externality model (EXMOD) are used to examine the specification of methods design and application factors in the computation of electricity externalities. We report the sensitivity of externality estimates with alternative specifications for 15 different factors in the analysis, including the selection of facility type, site, and operating characteristics; air emission assumptions and air modeling procedures; dose-response assumptions; economic valuation assumptions; and other modeling procedures and assumptions. Many of the factors that most influence externality computations can be well specified in the analysis, such as the facility type, age, characteristics, emission rates, whether there is SO₂ trading, and the inclusion of long range impacts. Most significant among the factors for which there remains significant scientific uncertainty are the selection and application of air dispersion models, selection of air pollution thresholds for health impacts, reduced life span risks associated with ozone exposure and with long-term exposure to PM₁₀, values for CO₂ damages, and the value to be applied to increased risks of reduced life span for individuals age 65 or older.     

Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?

This paper extends the literature on predation and mergers to a multi-firm setting. Two new arguments why predation is rational when a merger is an alternative are provided. First, predation is less prone to the free-rider problem, since mergers concentrate the costs of eliminating a rival with one firm, whereas predation allows the costs to be spread out. Second, predation can be profitable since it limits the negative effects of the bidding competition for the prey. It is also shown that a restrictive merger policy might be counterproductive by “helping” predators avoid the disadvantageous bidding competition for the prey.     

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.