Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

The factory system in the British industrial revolution: A complementarity thesis

This paper offers an explanation for the rise of the factory system in Britain during the Industrial Revolution (1770-1850) based on the concept of complementarity: Investment in machinery, process supervision, and improved quality control formed a cluster of complementary activities in which adopting any one increased the marginal return to also adopting the others. Further, factory owners introduced process supervision not only to increase work effort, but also to balance worker incentives among production, quality control, and asset maintenance tasks. To test this hypothesis, I have constructed a new data set from firm studies and archival records. Measures of firms’ adoption of the activities are positively correlated in the cross-section of firms, providing evidence in favor of the complementarity hypothesis.     

Looking behind the curtain—effects from modernization of European Union competition policy

The European Commission issued a proposal for reform of some aspects of Communitary competition policy. In particular, proposes a shift from ex-ante control (notification system) to an ex-post control regime of agreements (or decisions) conflicting with Article 81 (Ex-Article 85).We highlight the expected effects of this shift on the type of agreements that firms will implement. The type of agreements has been taken as exogenous in most analysis of the reform proposal. We contend that significant economic effects may result from recognizing the endogeneity of agreements.We predict that the proposed reform will result, in general, in firms implementing less restrictive agreements.     

Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.     

Foreign direct investment, competition and industrial development in the host country

This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: A competition effect which deters entry of domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the number of domestic firms follows a u-shaped curve, where the competition effect first dominates but is gradually outweighed by positive externalities. Evidence for Ireland tends to support this result. Specifically, applying semi-parametric regression techniques on plant level panel data for the manufacturing sector we find that while the competition effect may have initially deterred local firms’ entry, this initial effect has been outpaced by positive externalities making the overall impact of FDI largely positive for the domestic industry.     

Trade unions vs. statistical discrimination: Theory and application to post-apartheid South Africa

A simple model of statistical discrimination is analyzed, which captures some stylized facts of the South African labor market. It shows that this type of discrimination disappears when the wage rates are determined by efficient bargaining between a representative firm and a union, with endogenous membership. This may explain why the wage gap between Black and White workers in post-apartheid South Africa is smaller among unionized workers than among non-unionized ones.     

A general equilibrium analysis of software development: Implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement

We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.     

Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.