Mergers, brand competition, and the price of a pint

Mergers in the UK brewing industry have reduced the number of national brewers from six to four. The number of brands, in contrast, has remained relatively constant. We analyze the effects of mergers on brand competition and pricing. Brand-level demand equations are estimated from a panel of draft beers. To model brand-substitution possibilities, we estimate the matrix of cross-price elasticities semiparametrically. Our structural model is used to assess the strength of brand competition along various dimensions and to evaluate the mergers. In particular, we compute equilibria of pricing games with different numbers of players.     

On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market

In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.     

Modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production

Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of “substitutive” synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences.     

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

Multiplant firms pit their facilities against each other for production assignments. The present paper studies the consequences of this practice in a model where production is limited by capacity constraints and asymmetric information allows facilities to accumulate slack. It shows the amount of slack per unit of output to be pro-cyclical. Indeed, as capacity constraints become more acute in economic booms, the power of in-house competition for quota assignments is reduced and slack per unit of output increases, while the opposite is true in downturns. Moreover, in downturns firms may use higher cost facilities even when lower cost plants are not running at capacity since this boosts X-efficiency in low-cost plants.     

Consumer inertia, firm growth and industry dynamics

We develop a model of firm size, based on the hypothesis that consumers are “locked in,” because of search costs, with firms they have patronized in the past. As a consequence, older firms have a larger clientele and are able to extract higher profits. The equilibrium of this model yields: (i) A downward sloping density of firm sizes. (ii) Older firms are less likely to exit than younger firms. (iii) Larger firms spend more on R&D.     

A mechanism implementing the proportional solution

We consider the problem of a commonly owned technology which transforms a single input into a single output. We are interested in implementing a social choice rule called theproportional solution. We introduce a mechanism which implements the proportional solution in Nash, strong (Nash) and undominated Nash equilibria. In the mechanism each agent announces only two numbers which can be interpreted as the total output and her share of the total input-output combination. This paper was originally titled "Doubly implementing the proportional solution." I would like to thank my advisor William Thomson for his detailed comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Banks and Sung-Whee Shin for their comments. Two anonymous referees and an editor’s comments improved this paper substantially.     

Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship

Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Our results hold even when we correct for the availability of financing, the degree of protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations.     

利用闪存芯片作存储器的单片机应用系统

在测量及测试应用系统中,为使现场采集的数据在突发性的掉电过程中不被丢失,且能长时间的保持,可采用32M位闪存芯片KM29N32000TS作为存储器。本文以AT89S51单片机为例介绍它在单片机系统中的硬件连接和软件编程方法。     

野生纤维之王——罗布麻

文章阐述了罗布麻纤维的物质组成、形态结构,探索了提取罗布麻纤维的初加工工艺流程,分析了其药用价值和纺织保健开发价值。