Currency competition: A partial vindication of Hayek

This paper establishes the existence of equilibria for environments in which outside money is issued competitively. Such equilibria are typically believed not to exist because of a classic overissue problem: if money is valued in equilibrium, an issuer produces money until its value is driven to zero. By backward induction, money cannot have value in the first place. This paper shows that overissuance is not a problem if agents believe that if an issuer produces more than some threshold number of notes, then only those notes issued up to the threshold will be valued; additional notes will be worthless. This result is very general, applying to any monetary economy in which equilibria with and without valued money exist if the money supply is finite. The paper also compares the allocation achieved by a monopolist to that achieved with competitive issuance in both a search and an overlapping-generations environment. The results depend on the environment considered, but two general conclusions arise. First, it is ambiguous whether competitive issuers can achieve a more desirable allocation than a monopolist. Second, with competitive issuance, a licensing agency can always improve on pure laissez-faire and achieve the efficient allocation in the long run.     

Who Receives Medicaid in Old Age? Rules and Reality

Medicaid is a government programme that also provides health insurance to the elderly who have few assets and either low income or catastrophic health care expenses. We ask how the Medicaid rules map into the reality of Medicaid recipiency, and we ask what other observable characteristics are important to determine who ends up on Medicaid. The data show that both singles and couples with high retirement income can end up on Medicaid at very advanced ages. We find that, conditioning on a large number of observable characteristics, including those that directly relate to Medicaid eligibility criteria, single women are more likely to end up on Medicaid – so are non‐white people, but, surprisingly, their higher recipiency is concentrated in the higher income percentiles. We also find that people with low incomes who have a high‐school diploma or higher degree are much less likely to end up receiving Medicaid than their less‐educated counterparts. All of these effects are large and depend on retirement income in a very non‐linear way.     

Reserve Requirements,Liquidity Risk,and Bank Lending Behavior

Although reserve requirements (RR) have been used in emerging markets to smooth credit cycles, the transmission mechanism remains blurry. Using bank‐level data, we unveil the interaction of RR with bank lending. We identify a new channel that works through a decline in banks’ liquid assets and loan supply due to an increase in RR. “Quantitative tightening” through RR raises the short‐term funding needs of the banking system, which is met by collateralized central bank lending, thus depleting banks’ unencumbered liquid assets. Our results suggest that such a shift in bank liquidity is associated with a significant change in lending.     

On Quality and Variety Bias in Aggregate Prices

How do product variety and quality affect the aggregate price bias? We develop a general equilibrium model that accounts for the joint interaction of product quality and variety. Our findings show that the aggregate price bias is procyclical and the contribution of product variety is persistent whereas the contribution of product quality becomes countercyclical in the medium to long run. We show that accounting for product quality and variety has critical implications on the measure of cyclical fluctuations. Measurements of cyclical fluctuations derived using the consumption deflator, which abstracts from changes in product quality and variety, underestimate the variables' true volatility.     

Fair value disclosures and crash risk

In response to the public criticism of the inadequate disclosures mandated by SFAS No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, the FASB issued ASU (Accounting Standards Update) 2010–06, Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements, and ASU 2011–04, Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements, in an effort to increase the reporting transparency. We examine whether the increased fair value disclosures required by these two updates effectively decrease crash risk, defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. In support of the hypothesis, we find that increased transparency from these updates reduces crash risk among U.S. banking firms and that the reduction is greater in banks that have a higher level of Level 3 financial assets.     

Internal Markets,Management by Targets,and Quasi‐Markets: An Analysis of Health Care Reforms in the English NHS

There have been two major attempts to introduce market mechanisms into England's National Health Service: the ‘internal market’ reform project of the 1990s, and the ‘quasi‐market’ of the 2000s. Despite their similarities, the former attempt was on balance unsuccessful while the latter succeeded. This article examines and compares the outcomes of the two periods, analysing the reasons for their relative successes and failures. It goes on to highlight options for future reforms that would build on those achievements.     

N‐FIRM OLIGOPOLY WITH GENERAL ISO‐ELASTIC DEMAND

In this note oligopoly with iso‐elastic demand is analysed. Unlike previous studies we consider general iso‐elastic demand rather than the case of unit elasticity. An n‐firm Nash‐Cournot equilibrium for the case of heterogeneous constant marginal costs is derived. The main result is a closed‐form solution that shows the dependency of the equilibrium on the elasticity of demand and the share of industry costs. The result has applications to a wide range of areas in oligopoly theory by allowing comparisons across markets with different elasticities of demand.     

Measuring the liquidity part of volume

Based on the concept that the presence of liquidity frictions can increase the daily traded volume, we develop an extended version of the mixture of distribution hypothesis model (MDH) along the lines of Tauchen and Pitts (1983) to measure the liquidity portion of volume. Our approach relies on a structural definition of liquidity frictions arising from the theoretical framework of Grossman and Miller (1988), which explains how liquidity shocks affect the way in which information is incorporated into daily trading characteristics. In addition, we propose an econometric setup exploiting the volatility–volume relationship to filter the liquidity portion of volume and infer the presence of liquidity frictions using daily data. Finally, based on FTSE 100 stocks, we show that the extended MDH model proposed here outperforms that of Andersen (1996) and that the liquidity frictions are priced in the cross-section of stock returns.     

Heuristic learning and the discovery of specialization and exchange

I develop and calibrate an agent-based model of boundedly rational, adaptive agents in a two-good production and exchange economy to replicate human-subject outcomes in the same eight-person experimental economy. To test agents’ ability to capture human behavior, I extend the model and use its output to make predictions about a second experimental environment in which the group of eight agents is slowly constructed by merging smaller groups. This environment improves human-subject performance in the specialization and exchange task, and commensurate improvement emerges for some parameterizations of the agent-based model. This iterative process yields incremental improvement of decision-level theories about economic discovery.     

A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS

The paper analyses the optimal pricing of the product quality scheme when concerns for relative standing exist among consumers. We demonstrate that if the proportion of high‐value consumers is over (respectively, under) 1/2 of the total consumers, a firm has an incentive to select a large (respectively, small) quality gap among products. Therefore, there exists a cut‐off level for status concerns, which eliminates quality differences, and the firm assigns the same quality to all the consumers. These results indicate that consumers’ qualities will reflect distortions at the top and bottom. Accordingly, the firm's profit depends on which consumer category is larger.