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991.
Debt, managerial compensation and learning 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Neelam Jain 《European Economic Review》2006,50(2):377-399
Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play—providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through bankruptcy, acts as a substitute of compensation in both dimensions and derive conditions under which debt lowers average compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. We also examine the choice of debt and show that firm value can be increased due to debt's effect on managerial compensation, abstracting from other costs and benefits of debt. Finally, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters. 相似文献
992.
In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant. 相似文献
993.
The consumer benefit in a discrete choice model is often measured by maximum utility. We characterize the conditional (on the chosen alternative) and the unconditional distribution of maximum utility. We show that among a wide class of distributions (independent with convex supports) of error terms, the Type I extreme-value distribution is the unique distribution which ensures that all the conditional distributions of maximum utility coincide. Moreover, we show that for i.i.d. (with convex support) error terms, the invariance of conditional expected maximum utility characterizes the multinomial logit model. 相似文献
994.
Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations. When more serious mistakes are less likely, the stochastically stable states are those allocations, always efficient, with the lowest envy level. 相似文献
995.
Murat Sertel 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,118(1):103-117
Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individually rational sub-allocation the complementary coalition picks, when we paste all the agents back together at their new endowments and apply the allocation rule to this “collage” economy, each member of the former coalition will be strictly better off than under direct application of the allocation rule to the original economy. 相似文献
996.
997.
The use of foreign direct investment as a channel of international spillovers is by now fairly established in the empirical literature on innovation and growth. It is often argued that subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises are a mechanism through which technological know-how flows across borders. For foreign subsidiaries to be channels of international spillovers, these subsidiaries need to source know-how internationally and transfer their know-how to the local economy. Using direct firm level evidence from the Belgian Community Innovation Survey on the occurrence of technology transfers, we find that foreign subsidiaries are indeed more likely to acquire technology internationally. But after controlling for the superior access to the international technology market that foreign subsidiaries enjoy, we find that these firms are not more likely to transfer technology to the local economy as compared to local firms. 相似文献
998.
Pietro F. Peretto 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):353-382
I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c) reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth. A general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in Schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax reforms. 相似文献
999.
Matti Suominen 《European Economic Review》2004,48(6):1227-1241
In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases. 相似文献
1000.
We investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. First, we study the case where the regulator makes long-term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology. We show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, and standards may give stronger incentives than permits. Second, we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies. We show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first-best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested, whereas this does not always hold if he moves first. 相似文献