Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

Real estate prices and systemic banking crises

The collapse of real estate prices has historically jeopardized banking stability and triggered systemic banking crises. This paper studies risk contagion in a banking system in real estate price shock by adopting complex network theory. Modelling the real estate-related asset as a common exposure of banks to the real estate market, we propose a model that incorporates two main risk contagion channels, i.e., the financial network and asset fire sales, and reveal how the real estate price shock is transmitted and propagated across banks. We demonstrate that banking stability is highly sensitive to the real estate price shock. Moreover, due to the particularly low liquidity of the real estate market, the asset fire-sales of real estate assets overwhelms the financial network, playing the dominant role in risk contagion. Our model can be adopted by regulators to conduct stress testing and to forge effective risk management strategies.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION,POLITICS AND RELIGION: INSIGHTS FROM TUNISIA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

This paper analyzes the relationship between access to infrastructure services and support for religious parties based on the evidence produced by a recent democratic experience in Tunisia in which a religious political party, Ennahdha, governed from 2011 to 2014. The experience points to a complex relationship. In the 2011 election, areas with higher access are associated with higher support for Ennahdha than areas with lower access. In the 2014 election, however, infrastructure access is positively correlated with support for the party in areas where access had improved but negatively correlated with support for the party in areas that already had high access. A possible pragmatic general implication is that, to be politically competitive, religious parties, cannot bet solely on their religious commitment to provide basic services, including infrastructure, to the poor. They need to recognize the multiplicity of voter's concerns and their evolving agenda.     

新《行政诉讼法》有关判决方式的文本解读

新《行政诉讼法》关于行政诉讼判决方式的修改内容丰富、特色鲜明、亮点颇多,有必要在法治国家的背景下对其深入解读。新《行政诉讼法》的判决方式具有五大亮点,修订后的判决方式彰显了国家治理的法治现代化。对于新《行政诉讼法》有关判决方式的适用我们需要注意四个层面的内容。新《行政诉讼法》对判决方式的修订并不完美,但是瑕不掩瑜,通过这次修法,我国行政审判将会以判决方式的改变作为基点迎来发展的契机。     

Clustered airline flight scheduling: Evidence from airline deregulation in Korea

This paper explores the impacts of competition level on airline scheduling in the Korean domestic short-haul routes where a hub-and-spoke system is not the optimal air transport network strategy. The empirical findings using the Korean airline panel data for the period 2006–2010 suggest that competition leads to less differentiated departure flight times as expected from spatial competition theory. Unlike the previous study on the U.S airline industry, the degree of this tendency for less differentiation differs across the type of routes: the Jeju island routes (leisure type) and the inland routes (business type), in the deregulated period. Following the May 2008 Deregulation Act we find an increasingly clustered pattern of airline scheduling in the Jeju island routes where there have been competitive pressures associated with new low cost entrants. This recent evidence would imply that airline carriers strategically schedule departure flight times and allocate flights between routes as competition increases in the deregulated period.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

Does computer penetration increase farmers’ income? An empirical study from China

The diffusion and adoption of modern information technology provide new chance for China to close urban-rural income gap. This paper uses China's provincial panel data from 2002 to 2013 to investigate the effect of computer penetration on rural residents' income. A public program aiming to connect every village with broadband Internet and other rural facilities provides plausibly exogenous variation in rural residents' availability and adoption of the broadband Internet, which is used to explore the instrument variable for rural computer penetration. The results show that rural computer penetration tends to increase rural residents' income over time, but the average effect remains limited. The dynamic panel threshold effects model, which allows for both the threshold variable and other covariates to be endogenous, is further used to explore the constraints of the income-increase effect of rural computer penetration. It shows that the effect is at least doubled over the average effect estimated from instrument variables method, once the digital divide causes are removed. Our findings have important implications for the government to increase rural residents' income and reduce urban-rural income gap by encouraging rural computer usage and removing the digital divide.     

Mass media and preferences for redistribution

This paper investigates how mass media potentially act on preferences for redistribution. Our hypothesis is that media contribute to shaping the value system of a person, which affects support for redistribution. A theoretical model is proposed which combines demand- and supply-driven media bias. On the demand side, the model considers two types of individuals: non-partisan, whose values are influenced by the media, and partisan, who have strong opinions not affected by the media. We assume that although partisan individuals prefer unbiased information, they hold beliefs that they like to be confirmed; therefore, they tend to consume media with an ideological position similar to theirs. On the supply side, we focus on interest groups’ pressure on media coverage. Our results suggest that the anti-equality lobby is willing to pay more than the competing lobby. Moreover, we show that media bias is a decreasing function of the advertising revenues and an increasing function of the relative weight of ideology vs pluralism in individuals’ demand for media. Adding a second media outlet reduces the likelihood of media bias but not its extent. Finally, if both lobbies are active, the two outlets’ ideological positions are polarised.