Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty

When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called “Knightian uncertainty.” The effect of Knightian uncertainty on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to be drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty in the form of risk. Specifically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of investment opportunity while an increase in risk increases it.     

Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction. Moreover, a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production.     

The impact of product diversification strategy on the corporate performance of large Spanish firms

We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable, as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance, which performance is not significantly different between them.     

The impact of environmental regulation on productivity in German industries

The objective of this paper is to adjust a traditional total factor productivity (TFP) measure for the direct effect of environmental regulation on material and capital input. For this purpose we consider the fact that part of material input and pollution abatement capital have not been used to increase output but to cover the cost of using the environment as a factor of production. Therefore TFP growth rates are lower if part of the material input is allocated to abatement activities instead of producing output. We propose to treat compliance with environmental regulation as an unproductive input linked to the use of productive material input. Our aim is to answer and discuss two questions: How to measure the effect of environmental regulation on TFP, and does the effect matter. We examine data from 1975–1991 for ten pollution intensive German industries.We would like to thank Cornelia Oßwald for valuable research assistance. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Antidumping duties, undertakings, and foreign direct investment in the EU

We study the effects of EU antidumping policy when foreign firms can ‘jump’ antidumping duties through foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU. We show that duty jumping or duty pre-empting FDI occurs if the EU administration has broader objectives than protecting EU industry's profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad. The (expectation of) price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in FDI and may even discourage FDI as long as products are not too differentiated. The results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping FDI.     

Economic integration and the profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

The 1990s was a decade of increased economic integration. The decade also witnessed a sharp increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. From a theoretical perspective, the increase in international mergers in more integrated economies is rather puzzling. It is a well-established result that due to the “business stealing effect”, mergers in integrated markets are not likely to be profitable. A reasonable conjecture would therefore be that closer integration of markets would reduce the attractiveness of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The present paper demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case: Economic integration may trigger cross-border acquisitions by reducing the business stealing effect and by reducing the reservation price of the target firm. The paper thus provides explanations to the observed increase in cross-border mergers in a world of more integrated economies.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model.