A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises.     

Modelling demand for lotto using a novel method of correcting for endogeneity

Modelling lottery sales as a function of the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the probability distribution of returns potentially gives insights into how the design of a game could be modified to maximise net revenue. But use of OLS is problematic because the level of sales itself affects values of the moments (and insufficient instruments are available for IV regression). We draw on the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium, developing a new regression model which corrects for endogeneity where the causal impact of the dependent variable on the right-hand side variables is deterministic. We apply the model to data on lotto sales from Spain. Using the Spanish data, we show that results provide more reliable guidance to lottery agencies because accounting for endogeneity leads to significantly different results from OLS and these results have superior performance in out-of-sample forecasting of sales. More generally, results prove consistent with the Friedman-Savage explanation of why people buy lottery tickets and with evidence from racetrack data that ‘bettors love skewness’.     

Observability and incentive in organizations

The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large.     

Standards vs. labels with imperfect competition and asymmetric information

I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical differentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full information.     

Differentiated interchange fees

Payment networks typically differentiate interchange fees across different merchant sectors. This paper shows that it is generally efficient for a regulator to leave the decision on the structure of interchange fees to payment networks.     

Does labor diversity promote entrepreneurship?

We find evidence that workforce educational diversity promotes entrepreneurial behavior of employees as well as the formation of new firms, whereas diversity in demographics hinders transitions to self-employment. Ethnic diversity favors entrepreneurship in financial and business services.     

A Comparison of EPI Sampling, Probability Sampling, and Compact Segment Sampling Methods for Micro and Small Enterprises

Finding an efficient method for sampling micro- and small-enterprises (MSEs) for research and statistical reporting purposes is a challenge in developing countries, where registries of MSEs are often nonexistent or outdated. This lack of a sampling frame creates an obstacle in finding a representative sample of MSEs. This study uses computer simulations to draw samples from a census of businesses and non-businesses in the Tshwane Municipality of South Africa, using three different sampling methods: the traditional probability sampling method, the compact segment sampling method, and the World Health Organization's Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) sampling method. Three mechanisms by which the methods could differ are tested, the proximity selection of respondents, the at-home selection of respondents, and the use of inaccurate probability weights. The results highlight the importance of revisits and accurate probability weights, but the lesser effect of proximity selection on the samples' statistical properties.     

The determinants of price in 3G spectrum auctions

This article examined the empirical relationship between prices paid for national 3G wireless licenses when spectrums were sold by auction. The reduced-form modelling approach was based on the premise that auction design features can, and do, affect both final (revenue) and intermediate (viz., auction competitiveness and license assignment) auction outcomes. Importantly, the analysis recognizes, and explicitly allows for, the endogeneity of bidder entry and sample selection arising from an absence of bidding. Generally, these key features have only received attention in isolation. In particular, the study addressed the principal question of: which regulator chosen auction design variables determine prices paid in spectrum auctions? The analysis showed that flexible-package formats increased prices paid, and that higher reserve prices had a dampening effect. The article also showed that longer license terms and more competitive auctions (as measured by the bidders-to-licenses ratio) enhance prices paid.     

INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION,POLITICS AND RELIGION: INSIGHTS FROM TUNISIA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

This paper analyzes the relationship between access to infrastructure services and support for religious parties based on the evidence produced by a recent democratic experience in Tunisia in which a religious political party, Ennahdha, governed from 2011 to 2014. The experience points to a complex relationship. In the 2011 election, areas with higher access are associated with higher support for Ennahdha than areas with lower access. In the 2014 election, however, infrastructure access is positively correlated with support for the party in areas where access had improved but negatively correlated with support for the party in areas that already had high access. A possible pragmatic general implication is that, to be politically competitive, religious parties, cannot bet solely on their religious commitment to provide basic services, including infrastructure, to the poor. They need to recognize the multiplicity of voter's concerns and their evolving agenda.     

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.