Location and ownership of public goods

We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.     

A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS

The paper analyses the optimal pricing of the product quality scheme when concerns for relative standing exist among consumers. We demonstrate that if the proportion of high‐value consumers is over (respectively, under) 1/2 of the total consumers, a firm has an incentive to select a large (respectively, small) quality gap among products. Therefore, there exists a cut‐off level for status concerns, which eliminates quality differences, and the firm assigns the same quality to all the consumers. These results indicate that consumers’ qualities will reflect distortions at the top and bottom. Accordingly, the firm's profit depends on which consumer category is larger.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

Health insurer market power and primary care consolidation

This paper analyzes how health insurance market concentration impacts the market structure of primary care physicians. In more concentrated insurance markets, physicians are found to work in larger practices and their practices are more likely to have a hospital with an ownership interest. Physicians are also less likely to report being in a competitive physician market, consistent with practice consolidation. Our results suggest that consolidation in insurance markets impacts the competitive structure of physician markets.     

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMPETITION ON SECTORAL GROWTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This paper examines the impact of competition on the total factor productivity (TFP) of 21 manufacturing sectors in eighteen OECD countries over the period of time 1990–2006. We assume that the source of TFP growth can be either domestic or foreign innovation or technology transfer from the technological frontier. Trade openness, R&D, and human capital can have two effects: a direct effect on TFP (e.g., through innovation) and an indirect effect depending on the productivity gap between a given country and the technological frontier. We find that tougher domestic competition is always associated with higher sectoral productivity. Both import and export penetrations are positively associated with an increase of TFP. However, the channels through which higher TFP is materialized are different: export penetration works through level effect, while import penetration acts mainly when conditional on the level of technological development. The economical magnitude of the effect is not trivial.     

Foreign direct investment and host country policies: A rationale for using ownership restrictions

This paper examines host governments' motivation for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms (MNFs) in foreign direct investment (FDI) projects. An MNF with a productivity advantage is willing to invest in a host country. The host government wants to capture the MNF's surplus yet cannot observe it due to the MNF's private information about its firm-specific advantage. In contrast, a joint venture (JV) partner might observe this surplus depending on its ownership share. The host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a JV. This calls into question the wisdom of calls for ‘liberalizing’ FDI flows by the wholesale elimination of domestic JV requirements. We show that the optimal mechanism involves ownership restrictions that decrease as the size of the MNF's firm-specific advantage increases.     

Too much of a good thing? Why altruism can harm the environment?

Success of eco-labeling schemes, broadly defined, varies among products and across countries. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that the nature of environmental attributes among products (i.e., private versus public) and the consumer type (i.e., egoist versus altruist) shape the overall performance of such schemes. In addition, we demonstrate that altruistic consumers exhibiting a too high willingness to pay for the eco-labeled product can inadvertently prevent egoistic consumers from purchasing it, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of environmental performance. Several policy and managerial implications are drawn.     

Divestitures,privatization and corporate performance in emerging markets

We use new firm‐level data to examine the effects of firm divestitures and privatization on corporate performance in a rapidly emerging market economy. Unlike the existing literature, we control for accompanying ownership changes and the fact that divestitures and ownership are potentially endogenous variables. We find that divestitures increase the firm's profitability but do not alter its scale of operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure – sometimes improving performance and sometimes bringing about decline. The effects of privatization are thus more nuanced than suggested in earlier studies. Methodologically, our study provides evidence that it is important to control for changes in ownership when analyzing divestitures and to control for endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of divestitures and privatization.     

HOME MARKET EFFECT AND TRADE COSTS*

Concerning industrial location, the home market effect (HME) predicts that a large country is a net exporter of industrial goods. Recent literature shows that high transport costs in the traditional sector may obscure the HME in an early model of two sectors à la Helpman and Krugman. This paper presents an alternative model that displays the relationship between the HME and arbitrary transport costs while allowing for the derivation of analytical results by simple algebra. Our results show that the transport costs in the traditional sector do not obscure the HME but constitute a dispersion force that decreases the impact of the HME.     

Mass media and preferences for redistribution

This paper investigates how mass media potentially act on preferences for redistribution. Our hypothesis is that media contribute to shaping the value system of a person, which affects support for redistribution. A theoretical model is proposed which combines demand- and supply-driven media bias. On the demand side, the model considers two types of individuals: non-partisan, whose values are influenced by the media, and partisan, who have strong opinions not affected by the media. We assume that although partisan individuals prefer unbiased information, they hold beliefs that they like to be confirmed; therefore, they tend to consume media with an ideological position similar to theirs. On the supply side, we focus on interest groups’ pressure on media coverage. Our results suggest that the anti-equality lobby is willing to pay more than the competing lobby. Moreover, we show that media bias is a decreasing function of the advertising revenues and an increasing function of the relative weight of ideology vs pluralism in individuals’ demand for media. Adding a second media outlet reduces the likelihood of media bias but not its extent. Finally, if both lobbies are active, the two outlets’ ideological positions are polarised.