倒签提单行为的法律性质及法律责任新探

倒签的提单仍然是有效的运输合同证明和物权凭证;倒签提单的行为是违约行为与侵权行为的竞合;收货人就承运人倒签提单的行为可在违约之责与侵权之责中,权衡利弊,二者择其一,更好地维护自身合法权益.     

Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.     

Prices vs. Quantities: The Irrelevance of Irreversibility*

We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls in a dynamic setup in which the decisions of some agents are irreversible. The assumption of irreversibility is shown to improve the performance of a tax relative to that of a system of tradable quotas and significantly alter the equilibrium behavior of agents. We nevertheless conclude that taking into account the fact that agents’ decisions may be irreversible does not lead to policy implications significantly different from those reached in a simpler model in which irreversibility is ignored.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

Simultaneous entry and welfare

I examine the welfare properties of free entry under conditions of simultaneous entry. Specifically, I consider the second-best problem of influencing the number of entrants while taking as given firm behavior upon entry. I consider two alternative models of simultaneous entry: grab-the-dollar entry and war-of-attrition entry. I show that, if entry costs are low, then the results from previous models of sequential entry are fairly robust to the possibility of simultaneous entry. If however entry costs are high, then the welfare effects of free entry depend delicately on the nature of the entry game being played.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ELECTRICITY UTILITY: THE CASE OF THE STATE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION OF VICTORIA, 1925–93

One of the most important microeconomic policy reforms of the 1990s was the restructuring of the Australian electricity supply industry. This process was encouraged by the perception that the state-owned electricity authorities performed poorly in the 1970s and 1980s. This article observes the long-term performance of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria over the course of most of its life. In particular the growth in demand for electricity in Victoria, the productivity growth of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, as well as electricity prices, profits and debt levels are presented over the longer term.     

A Cointegration Analysis of Car Advertising and Sales Data in the Presence of Structural Change

This paper examines whether there is a long‐run stable equilibrium relationship between advertising and sales across the market segments of the UK car industry over the period 1971–2001. In order to achieve this goal, we allow for structural breaks in the series using cointegration techniques. The results show the existence of long‐run equilibrium relationships in all six market segments, although in four of them the relationship is not stable. In general, one structural change is detected in the late 1970s and another in the early 1990s, coinciding with two economic recessions. When we do not account for structural changes, the estimated long‐run elasticities of advertising on sales are seen to be substantially downwardly biased. Finally, a noticeable increase is observed in long‐run elasticities in most car market segments during the nineties with respect to previous decades.     

Firm Growth and Failure in Increasingly Competitive Markets Theory and Application to Hospital Markets

Recent models of firm failure and growth have ignored demand factors. In this paper, we generalize these theoretical analyses to include demand factors in explaining failure and growth for heterogeneous firms in local markets facing imperfect but increasing competition. The model is then applied empirically to the hospital industry in California over the 1980s, during which time competition did intensify. We model the closure decision based on expectations of future growth, explicitly accounting for self selection and simultaneity. We find that both size and demand factors are important determinants of survival and growth     

US Antidumping Law and Competition in International Trade

It is usual to argue that the US antidumping code and legal practice have become a substitute for tariffs now severely limited by GATT and, somewhat like these displaced tariffs, they are intended to limit the extent of price competition by foreign sellers. However, there is one set of conditions under which the regulations and duties, and the accompanying increase in market price they bring about, increases domestic producer surplus more than they decrease consumer surplus and therefore increase domestic welfare. As is shown, these conditions require antidumping duties to exclude foreign manufacturers from the domestic market in a specific inverse relationship to the prevailing market price. While the duties imposed with an antidumping violation implicitly set out an exclusion rate for foreign manufacturers, there is little in the US code or legal practice which suggests that the duties and exclusion rates are established with this specific rule in mind.     

Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option

We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers share profits with shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the share of profits to be distributed between workers and shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The distributive share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.