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41.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
42.
Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, D91, C73.
Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. 相似文献
43.
Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers:
D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002. 相似文献
44.
Deepak K. Sinha 《Journal of Economics》1997,66(1):1-22
When all products in the economy are weak gross substitutes, preferences are homothetic, and firms face menu costs then all prices in an industry move together at the same rate. In the closed-loop Nash noncooperative equilibrium, all firms invest in productivity and reduce real prices. As a result, in the case of quadratic menu costs, the outputs of industries and the economy go up along S-shaped time paths characteristic of diffusion of innovations. 相似文献
45.
The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. 相似文献
46.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献
47.
具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。 相似文献
48.
49.
Robert U. Ayres 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1995,6(3):207-230
Economists are increasingly interested in forecasting future costs and benefits of policies for dealing with materials/energy fluxes, polluting emissions and environmental impacts on various scales, from sectoral to global. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are currently popular because they project demand and industrial structure into the future, along an equilibrium path. But they are applicable only to the extent that structural changes occur in or near equilibrium, independent of radical technological (or social) change. The alternative tool for analyzing economic implications of scenario assumptions is to use Leontief-type Input-Output (I-O) models. I-O models are unable to endogenize structural shifts (changing I-O coefficients). However, this can be a virtue when considering radical rather than incremental shifts. Postulated I-O tables can be used independently to check the internal consistency of scenarios. Or I-O models can be used to generate scenarios by linking them to econometric macro-drivers (which can, in principle, be CGE models). Explicit process analysis can be integrated, in principle, with I-O models. This hybrid scheme provides a natural means of satisfying physical constraints, especially the first and second laws of thermodynamics. This is important, to avoid constructing scenarios based on physically impossible processes. Process analysis is really the only available tool for constructing physically plausible alternative future I-O tables, and generating materials/energy and waste emissions coefficients. Explicit process analysis also helps avoid several problems characteristic of pure CGE or I-O models, viz. (1) aggregation errors (2) inability to handle arbitrary combinations of co-product and co-input relationships and (3) inability to reflect certain non-linearities such as internal feedback loops. 相似文献
50.
Eilon Solan 《Games and Economic Behavior》2000,31(2):245
A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all future payoffs are equal to the payoff at the stage of termination. We prove that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium payoff and that there are -equilibrium profiles with cyclic structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73. 相似文献