Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

Optimal order display in limit order markets with liquidity competition

Order display is associated with benefits and costs. Benefits arise from increased execution-priority, while costs are due to adverse market impact. We analyze a structural model of optimal order placement that captures trade-off between the costs and benefits of order display. For a benchmark model of pure liquidity competition, we give a closed-form solution for optimal display sizes. We show that competition in liquidity supply incentivizes the use of hidden orders to prevent losses due to over-bidding. Thus, because aggressive liquidity competition is more prevalent in liquid stocks, our model predicts that the proportion of hidden liquidity is higher in liquid markets. Our theoretical considerations ares supported by an empirical analysis using high-frequency order-message data from NASDAQ. We find that there are no benefits in hiding orders in il-liquid stocks, whereas the performance gains can be significant in liquid stocks.     

Capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a small open economy

Is there a link between capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a country with a floating currency? Shocks to capital flows into a small open economy lead to volatility in asset prices and credit supply. To lessen the impact of capital flows on financial instability, a central bank finds it optimal to use the domestic interest rate to “manage” the capital account. Capital account restrictions affect the behavior of optimal monetary policy following shocks to the foreign interest rate. Capital controls allow optimal monetary policy to focus less on the foreign interest rate and more on domestic variables.     

There is no smoke without a fire: The effect of government interventions in less advanced economies

The lack of liquidity in the interbank market during the crisis of 2007–2011 led governments to impose different policies to rescue their countries’ banking sectors. While in advanced countries interventions in the banking sector were mostly related to a lack of liquidity and significant asymmetric information regarding counterparty risk, in many less advanced countries they had a precautionary motive. In our article, we investigate the effectiveness of policy interventions on healthy banking markets, with possible negative spill-over effects from other countries. To this extent, we use an event study methodology to test the effect of liquidity and financial sector policy announcements on interbank spread changes in six Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period between 2007 and 2011. We find that standard liquidity interventions did not provide effective stabilization. In fact, our evidence suggests that the spread widened after their announcement, probably as a result of the negative signal and consequently increased risk aversion of banks. In such situations, regulators should consider policy instruments that aim to decrease uncertainty in the market.     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

On the role of Islamic and conventional banks in the monetary policy transmission in Malaysia: Do size and liquidity matter?

This paper empirically investigates the impact of monetary policy on the credit supply of Islamic versus conventional banks of Malaysia using an unbalanced panel dataset over the period 2005-2016. While estimating the effects of three alternative measures of monetary policy on banks' credit supply, we include several bank-specific and macroeconomic variables in the specification as control variables. We provide strong evidence on the existence of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism in Malaysia. Yet, we show that Islamic banks respond considerably less to changes in monetary policy instruments as compared to their conventional counterparts. We also find that the monetary policy measures affect small-sized banks and less-liquid banks more as compared to large-sized and more-liquid banks. Our findings suggest that for an effective monetary policy, there is a vital need to consider the nature of Islamic banking while devising any monetary policy instruments to manage credit supply in the economy.     

Credit card cash‐out as informal financing: Evidence from China

Using a proprietary account‐level database from a commercial bank in China, we document that credit card holders can ease their credit constraints through the practice of cash‐out based on bogus transactions using credit cards. We find that such behaviour might be beneficial to both cardholders and banks. First, we find that a 1% increase in the cumulative number of credit card cash‐out transactions lowers the probability of default by 9.59%. Second, for private businesses, a 1% increase in the number of abnormal cash‐out transactions lowers overdue risk by 13.45%. Third, by lowering the overdue risk, the card‐issuing bank earns a larger profit. Our results are consistent with the notion that unconventional credit card cash‐out can mitigate the extent of capital misallocation in emerging markets.     

金融集聚能缓解中小企业融资约束吗？——基于非线性和区域异质性的视角

以2009—2017年上市中小企业面板数据为样本，应用现金现金流敏感性模型分析了金融集聚对中小企业融资约束的影响。研究发现：整体上金融集聚可以一定程度缓解中小企业融资约束，但存在地区性差异，且门槛效应明显。金融集聚对低金融集聚水平地区的中小企业融资困境有明显改善，但其影响随着金融集聚水平的增加而减少。当金融集聚水平超过高门槛值时，这一作用非常微弱，总体上呈现非线性特征。这说明当金融资源高度集中时可能产生挤出效应。     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.