On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration.     

Business interests versus geopolitics: The case of the Siberian pipeline in the 1980s

In the years 1979–1984, the Soviet authorities and various coalitions of Western European companies, some of them subsidiaries of US corporations or benefiting from licences and patents, supported by state authorities, negotiated several agreements to provide credit and equipment for the building of a 3,500-mile-long gas pipeline between Northern Central Siberia and Western Europe. There was a fierce controversy between the US and European states and firms whether to honour such contracts or not amid renewed geopolitical tensions between East and West. Business history was thus intimately mixed with geopolitics and corporate commercial and industrial tactics were challenged by diplomatic ethics. While the rules of capitalism can once more be discussed, the numerous lobbying circuits are reconstituted in this article as a way to determine the potential freedom of action of day-to-day business when confronted with high-level politics.     

Political constraints to growth in an economic union

This paper studies the political economy of growth in an economic union such as the EU. In the spirit of Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti [Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F., 2006a, Distance to frontier, selection and economic growth, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4:1, 37–74; Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti, F., 2006b, Growth, development and appropriate versus inappropriate institutions, mimeo MIT.], as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, structural reforms that increase competition in intermediate goods sectors are necessary to boost innovation and productivity growth. Reforms, however, raise the opposition of incumbents and, therefore, are politically difficult to implement. When there are important cross-border policy spillover effects, national governments are more easily captured by vested interests, as they fail to internalize the benefits of reforms on the rest of the union. In this situation, productivity growth may be sluggish and the economy can fail to converge to the frontier. On the other hand, when policy is chosen by a union government (or a collective body that takes into account union welfare), the internalization of spillovers raises the perceived benefit of reforms and, consequently, lowers the ability of lobbies to obtain high levels of protection.     

Extractive Industries Reporting: A Review of Accounting Challenges and the Research Literature

While the extractive industries (EI) are of major significance economically, the reporting of their activities has been the subject of contentious debate posing dilemmas for regulators and standard setters over many decades. In order to ensure alignment with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) research project on EI, we first identify some important economic characteristics of EI and associated accounting challenges together with an overview of how current accounting standards deal with these challenges using International Financial Reporting Standards as the focus. Second, we conduct a review of extant research on EI reporting analyzed around the key areas of: (a) international diversity of accounting practices and the challenges facing information users; (b) standard-setting processes and lobbying behaviour that deals with why the IASB (and other standard setters) have not succeeded in developing rigorous standards for extractive activities; (c) the reporting of oil, gas, and mineral reserves, given that large proportions of the assets of EI firms (the reserves) are off-balance sheet; (d) environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting dealing with how EI firms have increased their reporting of ESG information in response to regulatory demands and pressure for voluntary disclosures; and (e) other EI related topics such as earnings management, risk disclosures, and voluntary disclosure behaviour. Finally, we present some conclusions together with suggestions relating to key areas for future research on EI reporting.     

Land inequality and the transition to modern growth

Can the initial distribution of land, in a country's early history, affect its subsequent economic development? In this paper, I show that when land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, the landed elite will lobby the government to raise barriers to industrialization in order to protect its rents in the rural economy. I develop a small open economy model in which barriers take the form of tariffs on the imports of intermediate inputs used in industry. Such tariffs can affect both the timing and the pace of industrialization. The quantitative application of the theory is motivated by an important question in economic history: why did Argentina not replicate Canadian economic success, despite reasonable expectations to the contrary in the late 19th century? I provide evidence that Argentina had a markedly higher inequality in land ownership than Canada. Taking as given the observed differences in land distributions in the early 20th century, the model produces differences in equilibrium tariffs similar to the ones observed at the time, and the ones required to account for the Canadian–Argentine income gap until 1950. Over time however, as land becomes unimportant in production, land inequality ceases to be a source of policy disparities and income gaps.     

Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?

We examine the relation between a firm’s campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures and its Tobin’s q. We follow other studies that use q to measure the value of the firm’s intangible capital (e.g., the value of advertising, R&D, or environmental performance). Researchers have found a positive and significant relation between intangible assets and q. If political capital exists, it is an intangible asset. However, we find little relation between q and political contributions, suggesting that campaign contributions may not have long term effects on political markets. This is consistent with the view that contributions are done by firms as a response to a short term opportunity not as a way of building long-term political capital.

Investment, expropriation, and unionization

In this paper, I examine an economy where output is produced from labor, capital and public services, and where firms and labor unions bargain over labor conditions and lobby the government over union bargaining power and public services. I compare three institutional cases: (a) competitive wage settlement, (b) bargaining over wages and employment, and (c) bargaining over wages only. I show that in cases (a) and (b) the government expropriates investment rents, but right-to-manage bargaining (c) protects investors from this expropriation.      

Lobbying on accounting standard setting in the parliamentary environment of Germany

This paper employs an expertise framework to analyze the case of lobbying on the modernization of German accounting regulation between 2007 and 2009. The parliamentary context of accounting standard setting in Germany provides a unique opportunity for an examination of lobbyists’ and parliamentarians’ use of rhetoric in the form of arguments and myths in the presence of an expertise gap between both parties. Lobbyists successfully follow rhetoric strategies of providing knowledge and demonstrating expertise to parliamentarians in the form of using a mixed approach of conceptual and self-referential arguments when expressing a neutral opinion. Apart from their argumentative rhetoric, lobbyists also create myths that transfer knowledge in a more subtle way by employing signifiers that are disentangled from the underlying message to be communicated. Parliamentarians respond by using self-referential arguments in cases where they support the regulatory proposals and enrich their arguments by continuing and amplifying the myths created by lobbyists. Parliamentarians’ adoption of these strategies demonstrates the effectiveness of the transfer of knowledge and provides evidence of the strategic exploitation of the expertise gap by lobbyists.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.