Socially responsible human resource management and hotel employee organizational citizenship behavior for the environment: A social cognitive perspective

Drawing on the social cognitive theory, this study intends to discuss the concept of socially responsible human resource management (SRHRM) and empirically examine the impact of SRHRM on hospitality employee’s organizational citizenship behavior for the environment (OCBE). By a two-stage survey of 270 responses from one chain hotel group in Shanghai, China, our findings indicated that SRHRM had a positive impact on OCBE; moral reflectiveness fully mediated the relationship between SRHRM and OCBE. Moreover, the effect of SRHRM on moral reflectiveness and the indirect impact of SRHRM on OCBE via moral reflectiveness were stronger with lower rather than higher levels of responsible leadership. These results extend the macro-level factors in influencing hospitality employee’s environmental-behavioral intentions and provide significant insights into why and how SRHRM affects hospitality employee OCBE. Finally, we outline the results, theoretical and empirical significance, and propose future research directions.     

Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard

Securitization improves liquidity in capital markets by allowing originators to remove issued loans from its balance sheet and use the proceeds for other purposes. Securitization is often suspected of being one of the main reasons for the recent financial crisis. One concern is that securitization leads to moral hazard in lender screening and monitoring. By selling loans to investors and removing them from their books, banks have a lesser incentive to carefully evaluate and monitor borrowers’ credit quality to ensure that they can repay their loans. One problem in the literature is that the analysis of securitization is very general and suffers from a lack of specific security design analysis under asymmetric information. We address the moral hazard problem using a principal–agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. We show that the optimal contract must contain a retention clause in the presence of moral hazard. The optimal retention is affected by tranching and credit enhancement.     

Workplace ostracism and knowledge hiding in service organizations

As a pervasive workplace phenomenon in service organizations, knowledge hiding can cause serious economic losses to companies. This study seeks to identify a new interpersonal antecedent of knowledge hiding, specifically workplace ostracism. We further focus on the moderating roles of negative reciprocity beliefs and moral disengagement in the relationship between workplace ostracism and knowledge hiding in service organizations. Using a time-lagged research design, we collected data from 253 samples in 17 Chinese hotels. As predicted, we found that workplace ostracism was positively related to hospitality employees’ evasive hiding and playing dumb, but not related to rationalized hiding. In addition, we supported a hypothesized three-way interaction involving workplace ostracism, negative reciprocity beliefs, and moral disengagement on evasive hiding and playing dumb, but not on rationalized hiding. In particular, workplace ostracism was most positively related to evasive hiding and playing dumb when both negative reciprocity beliefs and moral disengagement were high. However, workplace ostracism was not related to evasive hiding and playing dumb when service workers have low levels in either or both.     

Effective Control Rights in Vertical R&D Collaboration

Because of increasing technological complexity of new products, the manufacturers of final products more often seek access to external sources of knowledge at the early, market‐distant stages of innovation processes. However, they are confronted with a specifically high danger of moral hazard. Traditional management instruments fail to control that danger mainly for two reasons. First, the supplier activities are not transparent. Second, market‐distant R&D results are credence goods whose quality cannot be evaluated, not even ex post. It is the theory of incomplete contracts that solves the problem by allocating the so‐called control rights to the supplier. These rights primarily regulate the assignment of the intellectual property rights, the control of the R&D process, and the marketing of the final products that are based on the delivered R&D results. To date, we do not have any empirical evidence about the relative effectiveness of these control rights. Moreover, studies on incomplete contracts in R&D alliances only focused on the collaboration between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Our study fills these gaps. On the basis of a sample of French and German R&D suppliers, we find that only enforceable intellectual property rights assigned to the supplier effectively control moral hazard. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collateralization of business loans: Testing the prediction of theories

Using confidential data on a large sample of relationship lending, we analyze the determining factors of the collateralization of business loans from banks, distinguishing between firms with observable risk and firms with hidden information. We achieve three main results. First, we provide evidence that observably riskier borrowers are encouraged to give more collateral to banks to obtain a loan, whereas firms with hidden information are less risky borrowers, offering collateral to signal their quality. Second, we show that relationship banking has a direct impact on the use of collateral and produces moderating effects on the other determining factors. Finally, we observe that distant bank branches—i.e., branches that encounter greater difficulties collecting soft information and obtaining site-specific data from headquarters—are more likely to require collateral than local bank branches.     

Efficient moral hazard

This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent’s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals. Since each principal’s return is not maximized by the agent’s optimal allocation, moral hazard occurs in equilibrium. However, since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects, the agent’s allocation of effort is efficient. If the agent chooses a single principal, then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient. These results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal-agent (P-A) and common agency (C-A) models.     

Database marketing modelling for financial services using hazard rate models

This paper investigates the effectiveness of using direct mail message as an element in the communication mix of a financial retail company. The focus in this study will be on interpurchase time, i.e. duration times between the last purchase of any type of financial service by a customer at that bank and the purchasing of a personal loan.

Our findings indicate that (1) direct mail message have a very significant effect on shortening the interpurchase time, (2) the combined effect of several direct mail messages exhibits diminishing returns to scale, (3) incorporating time-varying variables in the model significantly improves model results, (4) Ownership of certain other services has a significant impact on the probability of purchase of the personal loan, and (5) conditional probability of purchase is found to increase with time elapsed since last purchase. The latter finding shows that the receny effect, known to be very important in most RRM models, may to dependent on the product category.     

烟花爆竹用烟火药剂时间—压力测试研究

根据联合国《关于危险货物运输的建议书——试验手册》（小橙皮书）的要求,建立了烟火药剂时间-压力测试系统,对不同烟火药剂进行了测试,获得的试验结果对黑药、白药判定提供了试验数据,为烟花爆竹危险性分级提供了依据。     

石棉类物质的危害及其监管

以石棉类物质的危害及其监管现状为主题，首先整理分析了石棉的基本危害，及其在职业人群和普通人群中的病理学研究进展；再从监管的角度出发，总结归纳了世界各国的石棉监管政策及限量要求；在此基础上，对石棉类物质的防控措施进行综述。     

论法律和道德的关系

法律和道德是支配社会发展的两股力量,二者相互区别又相互联系。在我国历史进程中,法律和道德交相辉映,在经济政治的基础上左右着历史的走向。现实中法律和道德的冲突激烈,这促使我们以古看今,从古代法律道德关系的处理中寻求解决现实问题的途径。