压缩房地产贷款背景下的信贷风险及防范对策分析

进入2008年以来,中央继续对房地产贷款进行压缩控制,而在房地产信贷业中存在着各种风险,甚至可能导致金融危机。本文从房地产信贷业发展的现状出发,分析目前房地产信贷业存在的风险,并提出规避风险、促进房地产信贷业健康发展的对策。     

主体性德育理念下的德育评估

本文从主体性德育理念入手,在分析主体性德育理念的基础上,探讨如何根据这一理念的要求来完善德育评估。     

信息不对称理论下中小企业信用担保风险分析

信用担保是国际公认的高风险行业,信用担保市场上的信息不对称是信用担保风险客观存在且居高不下的主要原因。本文从信息不对称理论的视角,分析了中小企业信用担保风险的表现形式,并提出了解决信用担保过程中信息不对称问题的对策。     

国有企业人才流失的契约性阻挠与社会福利损失:一种代理理论分析

随着我国非国有经济的不断发展壮大 ,人才流失已对许多国有企业运行效率以及长期稳定发展造成严重影响。面对人才市场竞争 ,绝大多数国有企业在人才引进、人事管理以及收入分配等诸多领域都做出了适应性调整和改革。本文在一种委托—代理框架下 ,从契约理论角度考察了国有企业为防止人才流失所普遍实行的薪酬激励契约和阻挠人才流失契约之间的内在联系 ,然后在此基础上研究了阻挠人才流失契约如何影响社会总福利水平 ,并针对围绕国有企业劳动契约缔约过程所安排的正式制度上的某些缺陷 ,提出若干改革建议。     

Firm survival in the German automobile industry

In this paper, methods of duration analysis are applied to investigate determinants of firm survival in the German automobile industry during the period 1886–1939. A new comprehensive data set has been assembled in order to secure data comparable to that for the US automobile industry. Our results show that the forces shaping the survival pattern of firms over the life cycle are quite similar in both countries, i.e. early entry in the life cycle and prior experience are associated with a lower risk of exit. This finding holds equally when parametric, semiparametric and nonparametric methods are applied.We thank the participants of the 10th conference of the International Schumpeter Society in Milan, June 2004, and the 31st EARIE conference in Berlin, September 2004, for helpful discussion. We also thank two anonymous referees for their comments. All remaining errors are in our responsibility.     

“I’ll be Back” – Austrian Recalls

Using administrative data I estimate the chances of leaving unemployment for unemployed Austrians, distinguishing between finding a job with a new employer, returning to the previous employer, or leaving the labour market. There is evidence of substantial recall amongst unemployed Austrians, about a third of unemployed men are recalled. Competing risks analysis shows that the shapes of the hazards are different for the three risks. Workers who are recalled are a highly homogeneous group in comparison to the other unemployed.Thanks to Alison Booth, Simon Burgess, Stephen Jenkins, Karl Pichelmann, Mark Taylor, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and an anonymous referee. I also thank the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna for the kind provision of the data. Special thanks to Franz Brandel for his help with data extraction and management.     

Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case

Principal-agent models of moral hazard have been developed under the assumption that the principal knows the agent's risk-aversion. This paper extends the moral hazard model to the case when the agent's risk-aversion is his private information, so that the model also exhibits adverse selection. We characterize the optimal menu of contracts; while its detailed properties depend on the setting, we show that some of them must hold for all environments. In particular, the power of incentives always decreases with risk-aversion. We also characterize the relationship between the outside option and the optimal contracts. We then apply our results to testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets.The authors thank P.A. Chiappori, D. de Mezza, R. Myerson, C. Prendergast, the late S. Rosen, D. Webb and an anonymous referee for helpful discussions or comments, as well as seminar participants in Berkeley, Chicago, Montré al, Northwestern, Rome, Stanford and Wisconsin. Bruno Jullien gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fédération Francaise des Sociétés d'Assurance; Bernard Salanié thanks the University of Chicago for its hospitality.     

关于两课传统教学模式的反思

采用何种教学模式开展教学活动是关系到两课教学能否有效运行及教学实效性如何的重要问题。我国高校两课传统教学模式亟待创新，对其进行的研究尚处于起步阶段，还未形成比较系统独立的理论框架。从两课的教学观念、内容及方法等角度对其进行系统的探索与研究。     

The failure of new entrants in commercial banking markets: a split-population duration analysis

Almost one in four of the new commercial banks chartered in the United States during the 1980s failed. This study uses a split-population duration model to examine failure patterns and failure determinants for these banks and compares the results to a benchmark model estimated for small established banks. The results are consistent with a “life cycle” pattern of new bank failure: compared to small established banks, newly chartered banks are initially less likely, then substantially more likely, and finally equally likely to fail. These patterns were most extreme for banks chartered just prior to the banking recession of the late 1980s or early 1990s.     

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 ,政府剥夺企业的生产自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排