Profit shifting in the EU: evidence from Germany

The paper considers profit shifting behavior using data on German inbound and outbound FDI. It finds an empirical correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the net of tax profitability of its German affiliate that is consistent with profit shifting behavior. For profitable affiliates that are directly owned by a foreign investor the evidence suggests that a 10-percentage point increase in the parent’s home country tax rate leads to roughly half a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German subsidiary. On the outbound side of German FDI, the data provides some evidence that tax rate changes in the host country lead to a stronger change in after-tax profitability for affiliates that are wholly owned, which may reflect the larger flexibility of these firms in carrying out tax minimizing behavior without interference of minority owners. The hospitality and support by the Deutsche Bundesbank Research Center is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Oliver Busch, Michael P. Devereux, Ruud de Mooij, Chris Heady, Beatrix Stejskal-Passler, an anonymous referee, and participants of the IFS/ETPF conference 2006 for excellent comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.     

跨国公司内部贸易趋势及发展中国家的对策研究

在网络经济的影响下,跨国公司的外部市场环境和内部运营机制都发生了一系列变化。网络经济促进跨国公司内部分工的细化,对跨国公司内部贸易有进一步强化的作用,网络经济下的跨国公司内部贸易在数量和规模上仍有继续扩大的趋势。     

Multinationals do it better: Evidence on the efficiency of corporations' capital budgeting

With U.S. multinational enterprises playing increasingly important roles in the global economy, it is important to understand the efficiency of their capital budgeting decisions. We examine an unbalanced panel of 332 U.S. firms from 1992–2000. Using the deviation of a firm's estimated marginal Tobin's q from a benchmark as an indicator of effective resource allocation, we find that widespread multinationals make more efficient capital budgeting decisions. We also test whether this reflects the MNEs' investment locations, but do not obtain support for the hypotheses that they might be monitored by more agents or more successfully resist pressures from interest groups and governments.     

Cooperative ventures in emerging economies

Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow.     

Multinational firms, exclusivity, and backward linkages

How does the nature of contractual relationships between a multinational and its local suppliers affect backward linkages and welfare in the local industry? We address this question in a two-tier oligopoly model where a multinational transfers technology to its suppliers if they accept an exclusive contract that precludes them from serving its local rivals. Invited suppliers balance the benefits of gaining access to new technology and the derived demand of the multinational against the opportunity of selling to other local firms. Exclusivity reduces competition among local suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to autarky.     

产业组织结构对跨国公司市场进入方式的影响

跨国公司进入国外市场的方式是多个层面多种因素综合作用的结果。产业组织理论认为产业组织结构影响企业行为，因而产业组织结构也影响跨国公司的市场进入方式。本文结合中国几个产业的实际情况，重点探讨了促进跨国公司采用跨国并购方式进入国内市场的产业条件。认为，促进跨国并购的产业组织结构特征包括，市场集中度高，市场地域分割，国内外产业发展不平衡，国内外市场分割，国内市场容量大，成长率高等。     

从美国专利看跨国公司研究开发国际网络化的本质

本文对取得美国专利权的19家电子行业的跨国公司研究开发的国际化程度和趋势进行了实证分析.论文确认了19家跨国公司研究开发国际网络化进程中的差异,同时对日本电子行业的跨国公司在基础研究层面的研究开发活动进行了分析.结论是:在"市场竞争的全球化"和"向IT时代转型"这样的外部竞争环境中,为了开发适合全球化市场的新产品,跨国公司必须要在企业内建立一个在世界范围内进行优秀研究开发人才最佳配置的全球网络体系.     

跨国公司股权进入模式的博弈分析

本文从股权和控制权分离的视角对跨国公司股权进入模式进行了动态的博弈分析。跨国公司的股权进入模式,尤其是对控制权的配置,是在满足东道国企业和跨国公司双方激励相容和参与约束的条件下,由双方共同决定的一种相机性配置机制,目的在于尽可能减少当地企业实施机会主义行为的风险,同时又能适时地给予当地合作者以足够的激励,以尽可能地利用当地资源。     

Crossing the Boundaries of Obligation: Are Corporate Salaries a Form of Bribery?

Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) pay relatively high salaries to local people in host countries. TNCs assume that such employees will accept an employeeÇôemployer relationship similar to that which exists in North America, but the obligations and personal interests that such a relationship create often directly conflict with systems of obligation already established in the host country. When TNCs do business across the boundaries of systems of obligation, corporate salaries can be seen as a form of unethical bribery. In this paper, the core case of business bribery is described consistent with the usual philosophical analysis of bribery, and the grounds for thinking bribery is unethical are made clear. The amount of a bribe is irrelevant to the ethical analysis. Bribery is distinguished from tips and grease on structural grounds. The concept of a system of obligation is defined, and examples given that show the variability of systems of obligation in host countries. Arguments are given to show that salaries paid by TNCs create obligations and personal interests which sometimes conflict with existing systems of obligation, and that such payments have the same structure as more traditional forms of bribery. The ethical issues of corporations crossing the boundaries of systems of obligations are discussed.     

论中国保险公司的规模经济

保险公司只有达到一定规模才具有国际竞争力.保险公司的最佳经济规模在不同的时期受保险市场主体的多少、国家的保险产业政策等多种因素影响.我国保险公司与全球著名大型保险公司规模相比有较大差距,因此,规模经济对于提高中资保险公司的国际竞争力具有特殊的现实意义.中资保险公司可通过上市扩充资本金、并购、组建保险集团等途径实现规模经济.