Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

One prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two‐round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses ex post measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: a one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.27 percentage points, which corresponds to 1/7 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors such as electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race. While rain decreases turnout on average, this effect is mitigated in close elections, as indicated by a positive interaction effect of the two variables.     

Disclosure tone management and labor unions

By analyzing the influence of labor unions on the narrative content of corporate disclosures, we provide empirical evidence that managers deflate the tone of earnings press releases in order to convey to unions a less optimistic image of firm financial performance. We find that the tone of the qualitative information in earnings press releases is significantly less optimistic as the degree of unionization increases, and particularly when financial performance is strong. The results of quasi‐natural experiments suggest that labor unions causally affect the use of tone deflation, and the deflation is stronger during labor negotiations. Our findings also indicate that labor unions lead to a significant weakening of the signaling value of the tone of earnings press releases in predicting future performance.     

Budgets,expenditure composition and political manipulation

Abstract

This paper analyses the presence of political cycles in Portuguese Governments’ expenditures using monthly data over the period 1991–2013 for the main categories of government expenditures. The results indicate that Portuguese Governments act opportunistically regarding the budget surplus and that they favour capital instead of current spending near to the elections. Moreover, right-wing governments are more prone to reduce expenditures and deficits after the elections than left-wing ones. A deeper disaggregated analysis of the components of government expenditures corroborates these findings while disentangling other relevant patterns of political manipulation in Portugal.     

基于组织环境的村长选举机制及实证研究

选举的效果取决于组织环境,文章考察了两种组织环境并建立模型研究组织环境对选举效果的影响。得出结论：在规范的组织环境中。通过选举可以产生高才能的人才;在不规范的组织环境中,低才能人才被选中的机率更大。因此,提高管理水平,改善组织环境是保证选举机制良好运行的重要基础。     

The determinants of the vote for Trump: an analysis of Texas 2016 primary results

This article analyses the 2016 primary vote for Donald Trump in Texas. Much of Trump’s campaign rhetoric has been anti-immigrant. A major Trump campaign theme was his proposal to build a wall along the Mexico-U.S. border and make Mexico pay for it (Trump 2016). The econometric model estimated below uses county-level data for Texas. The dependent variable is the percent of the 2016 republican primary vote for Mr Trump. The model examines the electoral effects of Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric in a heavily Hispanic border state.     

Election forecasting: Too far out?

We consider two criteria for evaluating election forecasts: accuracy (precision) and lead (distance from the event), specifically the trade-off between the two in poll-based forecasts. We evaluate how much “lead” still allows prediction of the election outcome. How much further back can we go, supposing we tolerate a little more error? Our analysis offers estimates of the “optimal” lead time for election forecasts, based on a dataset of over 26,000 vote intention polls from 338 elections in 44 countries between 1942 and 2014. We find that optimization of a forecast is possible, and typically occurs two to three months before the election, but can be influenced by the arrangement of political institutions. To demonstrate how our optimization guidelines perform in practice, we consider recent elections in the UK, the US, and France.     

LOBBYING AND ELECTIONS

I analyse the interaction between post‐election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward‐looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with citizen candidates from a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters can be better off with lobbying.     

New methodology for calculating cost-efficiency of different ways of voting: is internet voting cheaper?

ABSTRACT

New ways of voting in elections are being sought by electoral administrations worldwide who want to reverse declining voter turnouts without increasing electoral budgets. This paper presents a novel approach to cost accounting for multi-channel elections based on local elections in Estonia. By doing so, it addresses an important gap in the academic literature in this field. The authors confirm that internet voting was most cost-efficient voting channel offered to Estonian voters.     

Forecasting multiparty by-elections using Dirichlet regression

By-elections, or special elections, play an important role in many democracies – but whilst there are multiple forecasting models for national elections, there are no such models for multiparty by-elections. Multiparty by-elections present particular analytic problems related to the compositional character of the data and structural zeros where parties fail to stand. I model party vote shares using Dirichlet regression, a technique suited for compositional data analysis. After identifying predictor variables from a broader set of candidate variables, I estimate a Dirichlet regression model using data from all post-war by-elections in the UK (n=468). The cross-validated error of the model is comparable to the error of costly and infrequent by-election polls (MAE: 4.0 compared to 3.6 for polls). The steps taken in the analysis are in principle applicable to any system that uses by-elections to fill legislative vacancies.