Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision

We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision.     

External balances,trade flows and financial conditions

This paper studies how changing expectations concerning future trade and financial conditions are reflected in international external positions. In the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the net foreign asset position of any country must, as a matter of theory, equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits, discounted at the cumulated world stochastic discount factor (SDF) that prices all freely traded financial assets. I study the forecasting implications of this theoretical link in 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United Kingdom) between 1970 and 2011. I find that variations in the external positions of most countries reflect changing expectations about trade conditions far into the future. I also find the changing forecasts for the future path of the world SDF are reflected in the dynamics of the U.S. external position.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the European financial crisis

Using a panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012, we investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the market for corporate assets. In particular, we test the ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis by analyzing the number of cross-border transactions, the price of corporate assets and the impact of credit and macroeconomic conditions. According to the fire-sale FDI hypothesis, countries affected by a crisis attract foreign buyers selling assets at a discount. We find a dampening effect of the crisis on cross-border transactions in all EU countries. Although countries with higher sovereign default risk and lower economic demand attracted more foreign buyers in the crisis, lower domestic credit is associated with less cross-border transactions. Corporate assets in crisis countries are cheaper, particularly if domestic credit is low; however, these findings are not limited to the crisis period. This pattern is strikingly different from the East Asian and Latin American financial crises. Overall, we find little evidence for ‘fire-sale FDI’ suggesting an integrated European market without significant frictions.     

The Global Financial Crises of 2007–2010 and the future of capitalism

This paper presents an analysis of the 2007-2010 Global Financial Crisis which started with the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. and became global very fast. It argues that the financial system in the United States is a complex interlocking structure of markets, institutions and regulators. The causes and culprits of the crisis, the misaligned incentives of participants and exogenous events such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitated failure in key markets: commodities, sub-prime housing, equities, and credit. One of the strategic consequences of this crisis is that the US will lose its dominance in world power, the frequent crises and vulnerabilities of the Neoliberalism and examines the future of capitalism. Of the alternatives to economic system, the capitalism is the most viable economic system. However, it must adopt real and efficient allocation of resources to maximize welfare of all parties and seriously address the income inequality. It must reject crony capitalism, enact true financial regulation of institutions and markets, end corporate socialism and address the system’s structural deficiencies.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Bidder's Gain: Evidence from Termination Returns

In most cases, bidder's stock returns around merger announcement convey more information than the synergy created from the acquisition. To overcome the interpretation problem, I study the bidder's return from the perspective of deal termination. Using a hand‐collected dataset on terminated merger proposals, I investigate termination returns in deals canceled for reasons unrelated to the bidder's stand‐alone valuation. I find that bidder's gain varies significantly with the type of target acquired. Further evidence suggests that the liquidity need of private target significantly contributes to the positive gain to the bidder.     

HOLDINGS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN COMPANIES IN FINLAND: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN THE LONGER TERM

Applying an approach of neo‐institutional research, this article examines the history of company holdings of the national government and local governments in Finland in the longer term. The article examines the genealogy of the institutional forms of these holdings, the diffusion, adoption and adaptation of these forms, and the political legitimacy of new forms and the political de‐legitimation of earlier forms. For theory, the results indicate that the individual tailoring of institutional forms offers flexibility but increases complexity. For practice, the results suggest that the company form may too easily marginalize alternative institutional forms such as co‐operatives, associations, and foundations.