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21.
权力使用贯穿于渠道成员间联系的始末,是为了使交易伙伴更好满足自身需求、实现经营目标而采取的手段。分析了两类权力使用(强制性、非强制性)的不同特征,以及其对渠道成员间竞争与合作程度和后续新产品开发绩效的影响作用。丰富了权力使用与渠道成员间竞争合作程度、新产品开发绩效的关系研究,对渠道成员更好地选择权力使用、管理渠道关系、维持持续性竞争优势具有一定的指导意义。  相似文献   
22.
Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China. Taking advantage of China’s institutional setup with ample bureaucratic transfers, the paper estimates leaders’ capabilities as their personal contributions to local economic growth. The paper finds strong evidence of political business cycles – a typical form of political opportunism – as manifested by a significant boost in the growth rate preceding the Communist Party’s national congress. However, more capable leaders are found to generate more modest political business cycles than less capable ones do. The findings suggest that, to the extent that political selections are associated with the long term reputation of officials, career-concerned opportunism is at least partially moderated by the selection of capable officials in China. The paper provides supportive evidence for the reputation model of political business cycles as well as enriches the study of government officials in weak institutional environments.  相似文献   
23.
机会主义理论视角下的会计信息披露失真问题研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
会计信息披露失真问题一直困扰着会计理论界和实务工作者,我们认为企业各产权主体的机会主义行为是造成会计信息披露失真的根本原因,本文从企业理论(契约理论)和产权理论角度,研究企业各产权主体的机会主义行为,分析其对会计信息披露失真的影响,并提出了通过从契约、市场、监管、道德以及利益相关者的利益约束五个方面对企业各产权主体的机会主义行为进行治理,达到减少会计信息披露失真行为的对策建议。  相似文献   
24.
科技项目是科技资源配置的最小单位,决定了科技资源的整体配置效率。由于科技项目中可能存在机会主义行为,致使我国科技资源配置效率较低。学术自尊、信息披露、制度执行、内部监督、科技评价和结题验收在理论上对科技项目机会主义行为治理存在促进效应,但这些要素的促进功能还存在一定不足。基于我国科研人员样本数据,借助结构方程模型,分析科技项目机会主义行为治理的微观机理,指出科技项目资源配置的优化方向,从科技管理微观层面提出机会主义行为治理策略,以提升我国科技项目研发效率,优化我国科技资源整体配置。  相似文献   
25.
This paper deals with the impact of suppliers' flexibility in the industrial markets and presents empirical results from the market research sector including outcome variables (market-uncertainty, relationship-specific investments, mutuality, opportunism, long-term orientation, planning, conflict management). We examined the antecedents of supplier flexibility. Buyers need to know whether supplier will modify existing agreements in cases where environmental factors change. Insufficient flexibility can lead to problems, such as having to accept services which no longer meet the buyer's needs. Accordingly, identifying indicators of supplier flexibility is an important objective for managers involved in the purchasing process of services.  相似文献   
26.
Cooperation is an important factor in improving the efficiency of agrarian reform, but hardly occurs, which is a serious problem in Brazil. This research tries to explain why cooperation is so difficult in Brazilian settlements. It focuses on the Midwest of Brazil, a region with a high concentration of land, located in the main region for production of commodities. Research combines a New Institutional approach with aspects from the economic sociology. The model developed in the paper is original and highlights factors responsible for cooperation. Research differentiates institutional arrangements according to asset specificity and sunk costs. Beside associations for representation with public authorities, where cooperation is easier, cooperative arrangements need specific investments from the settlers, who require warranties before participating. Institutions serve as warranties for adopted governances. In the case of cooperation in Brazilian settlements, these warranties should come from informal institutions, which can be a problem in some communities. Leadership of a producer can also have an important role in hierarchical networks.  相似文献   
27.
Referral reward programs are becoming a popular tool for acquiring new customers and bonding existing ones. Yet their benefits are contentious, since such campaigns are prone to the opportunistic behaviour of customers who merely want to reap the reward. This paper examines how participating in a referral campaign affects opportunistic recommenders. By conducting two experimental studies, this article shows that giving counterattitudinal referrals enhances the communicator׳s attitude and loyalty toward the recommended provider. However, the positive effect depends on the reward size. While referral reward programs with small incentives strengthen the recommender׳s attitude and loyalty, no impact was found for referrals with large rewards. The results show that a stronger focus on reward programs is worth considering, since service providers can benefit from opportunistic customers with regards to the bonding effect.  相似文献   
28.
As monitoring mechanisms are critical to exporter–distributor relationships, the effectiveness of different types of monitoring mechanisms remains an important issue. Our study goes beyond the separate effects of monitoring mechanisms on opportunism, and tests the moderating effects of market orientation (MO) and norm-based information exchange on the monitoring mechanism–opportunism relationship. Based on survey data of 160 export ventures in China, we find that process control increases distributor opportunism, while norm-based information exchange and MO decrease it. Moreover, at high levels of norm-based information exchange and MO, the impact of process control on opportunism turns from positive to negative.  相似文献   
29.
金融监管制度与机会主义行为机理研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
徐辉  李健 《当代经济科学》2012,(3):81-90,127
由于金融市场的信息不对称和外部性难以根本消除,致使机会主义行为难以避免。金融监管制度的演变即是保障存款人利益、预防和化解金融风险维护金融系统稳定的过程,也是对金融机构和监管机构及相关代理人机会主义行为规避和治理的过程。本文以委托代理模型为起点,分析金融机构经营信息已知和未知两种状态下监管机构和金融机构各自的效用函数,通过引入监管制度和代理人风险偏好变量分析其对机会主义行为的影响。研究发现:信息状态转变会引起监管契约从强制型契约向合作关系型契约转变,机会主义表现形式也随之变化;不对称信息下绩效挂钩的监管收入激励模式会同时增加监管者和金融机构代理人的机会主义倾向;信息结构变化要求监管制度也应发生变化才能适应监管有效性要求。  相似文献   
30.
中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究   总被引:109,自引:0,他引:109  
费用“粘性”指当费用随着业务量的变化而变化时 ,其边际变化率在不同的业务量变化方向上的不对称性。本文讨论了费用“粘性”的内容和目前对此的理论解释 :“契约观”、“效率观”和“机会主义观”。通过对 1 995年 1 2月 3 1日前上市的 2 92家公司从1 994— 2 0 0 1年的数据进行的分析 ,本文发现 :(1 )中国上市公司确实存在费用“粘性”。同美国上市公司相比 ,中国上市公司向下调整费用的速度要慢许多 ,这很可能是由于中国企业管理水平的低下和经理层代理成本的高昂。 (2 )费用“粘性”确实在以后的会计期间出现反转。在时间跨度拉长的情况下费用的“粘性”明显降低 ,这说明中国上市公司的经营管理还有一些效率 ,但是效率尚不够高。 (3 )效率观所隐含的“宏观经济增长”和契约观所隐含的“资本密集型”两个变量对费用“粘性”的增强效果不显著 ,这也许说明目前中国上市公司的经理层行为包含了“机会主义观”的因素。  相似文献   
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