金字塔式控股结构与上市公司资本运作的机会主义倾向

在处于金字塔式控股结构的上市公司中,反映实际控制人责任承担能力的现金流权与其影响公司决策的控制权是分离的,由此形成了责任与权利不对称的负外部性。不同于以往研究,本文从纵容市场炒作和资本运作这一新的视角,实证考察金字塔式控股结构下控股股东及其背后实际控制人资本运作的机会主义倾向,以此揭示金字塔式控股结构存在的其他负外部性。研究表明,随着金字塔结构复杂程度的增加,处在金字塔式控股结构下的上市公司的股票更具有“彩票股”的特征、非金融企业的金融资产配置更多,且会进行更多的关联资本运作,但这些行为并没有带来预期的企业绩效改善,而在很大程度上演化为以实现控股股东及其背后实际控制人财富短期快速增值为目的的机会主义资本运作行为。因而,金字塔式控股结构在一定程度上助长了“脱实向虚”的资金流动趋势,并加剧了资本市场的波动。如何抑制金字塔式控股结构的负外部性由此成为促使我国资本市场有效助力实体经济发展的关键环节之一。     

对高校教师人力资本投资风险及规避的新探讨

当今高校的竞争已日趋激烈,而竞争的根本在于高校优质的教师人力资本。优质教师人力资本的获得需要进行投资,但高校教师人力资本投资存在风险,如何规避风险成为高校关注的焦点。本文对高校教师人力资本投资风险进行了界定,认为高校教师人力资本投资风险主要表现为对教师投资后并没有达到预期的效果。深入分析了高校教师人力资本投资风险产生的原因,认为主要是由外部原因和内部原因两方面造成的,外部原因是由于市场供求的不平衡所决定的,内部原因是由于教师人力资本载体一教师的机会主义行为倾向和高校的体制缺陷所决定的。并提出了要从高校、教师自身和学生三方面入手,即学校方面要进行高校管理改革;教师方面要提高教师自身素质;学生方面要提高学习热情,来共同形成高校教师人力资本投资风险规避体系,来规避高校教师人力资本投资风险,为高校人力资本投资决策提供依据;     

机会主义、纵向一体化和网络组织

交易费用理论将机会主义作为人性的一个基本假设存在片面性,纵向一体化也并非是防范机会主义行为的唯一有效形式,某些特殊的经济组织同样具有防范机会主义的功能。网络组织是界于市场和企业之间的一种中间层组织,它因其特殊的契约特征、交易内容及治理机制而具有防范机会主义的功能。     

A meta-analytic review of opportunism in exchange relationships

The potential to engage in opportunism is a central theme in institutional economics, yet prior research has not quantitatively reviewed the role of opportunism in marketing research. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to synthesize research on opportunism conducted over the last quarter century. The analysis of 183 effect sizes extracted from 54 publications from the period 1982 to 2005 offers some support to extant channel theory. The research also indicates that the informant’s frame of reference and the research design significantly influence the observed effects. Implications of the findings and future research directions are discussed.

交易技术与交易所治理结构的演变--基于交易组织内部权利框架的比较分析

本文采用交易组织体的内部权利框架,对特异性投资下交易所的两种统一治理结构--互助性治理结构与营利性治理结构进行了比较,进而对交易所治理结构的演变给出了解释.本文的结论是,特定的治理结构是与特定的交易服务技术水平相适应的;随着生产交易服务的一项新技术的普及,在监管条件不构成组织演化障碍的情况下,与传统技术相适应的治理结构向与新技术相适应的治理结构转变是大势所趋.     

Disentangling political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors: A comparative approach

This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall, we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institutional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.     

Why,did I lose? Debriefing quality and its effects on justice,protests, and sales loss attributions

When suppliers lose in a competitive tender process, they need feedback to make accurate sales loss attributions and adjustments to their competitive strategy. Unfortunately, buyers seldomly provide sufficient feedback to enable diagnostics, learning, and adaptation. The purpose of this research is to explore a buyer's debriefing as an effective feedback mechanism. Based on data from a sample of 218 U.S. government source selections, a new construct, debriefing quality, is developed as a multi-dimensional construct comprised of: proposal efficacy information, procedural compliance and decision understanding information, and competitive intelligence information. Results show that debriefing quality enhances procedural justice and internal and external attributions and reduces supplier opportunism and perceptions of buyer opportunism. Further, the underlying procedural justice of the source selection deters bid protests, and debriefing quality can impact perceptions of procedural justice. Importantly, debriefing quality is essential in the assignment of loss attributions to strategy, thus affecting strategy change. These findings expand attribution theory by identifying new external attributions particular to a business-to-business context, namely suspicion of buyer opportunism and procedural justice. The study closes with specific information buyers can provide to suppliers to mitigate bid protests and help suppliers learn from the tender enabling future strategy improvements.     

Impact of macroeconomic policy uncertainty on opportunistic insider trading

The macroeconomic policy environment affects the internal governance of microenterprises, which may provide opportunities for management to benefit from stock sales while decreasing its motivation to manipulate stock transactions. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018, we study the impact of macroeconomic policy uncertainty on opportunistic insider trading. The results show that macroeconomic policy uncertainty helps restrain the opportunistic trading of shares held by management. When macroeconomic policies are uncertain, enterprises improve their internal governance. Furthermore, strengthening equity governance helps reduce management’s opportunistic use of the uncertainty of the policy environment, highlighting the advantageous effect of macroeconomic policy uncertainty and helping regulators standardize managerial behavior and promote the governance effect of macroeconomic policy.