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11.
"要素所有权"与"要素贡献"--论"按要素分配"问题的实质与衡量标准 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
我国实行的按生产要素分配,是根据不同生产要素的所有权关系,以及这些不同生产要素在财富的生产中所作的贡献产生的一种分配形式。“要素所有权”是生产方式的前提和起点,它决定生产资料和社会成员在各生产部门间的分配,是“按要素分配”原则存在的依据,“要素贡献”是按要素分配原则的最终决定因素。在按要素分配理论中,正确认识“要素所有权”与“要素贡献”两者间的内在联系和区别,是理解按生产要素分配问题的关键所在。 相似文献
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13.
Timothy R. Burch 《Review of Financial Economics》2003,12(4):345-362
We examine the pricing of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) by foreign firms that are already seasoned in their domestic countries. Presumably, these equity offers have less downside risk for investors than typical IPOs since domestic share prices can be used to help establish a preoffer value for the firm's equity. In spite of the presumed diminished downside risk, we find that offers by firms from countries that impose foreign ownership restrictions and capital controls are on average underpriced, experiencing an average first-day return in the United States of 12.7%. This result stems in part from the underwriter's failure to price the issue to fully reflect the postoffer premium that often arises for the U.S. shares. In contrast, offers by firms from countries without ownership restrictions have an average first-day return of 0.0%. 相似文献
14.
Bing Han 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2006,32(4):471-493
Real estate investment trust (REIT) provides a unique laboratory to study the relation between insider ownership and firm
value. One, a REIT has to satisfy special regulations which weaken alternative mechanisms to control agency problems. Empirically,
I find a significant and robust nonlinear relation between Tobin's Q and REIT insider ownership that is consistent with the trade-off between the incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect
of insider ownership. Two, many REITs are Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREITs) which have dual ownership structure. They have
both common shares and Operating Partnership Units (OP units). Property owners can contribute their properties to the UPREIT
in exchange for OP units. Their capital gains taxes remain deferred as long as they hold onto their OP units and the UPREIT
does not sell the properties they contributed. OP units owners are locked in with the firm and have incentive to monitor firm
management, but their interests diverge from the common shareholders because their tax bases are much lower. Consistent with
the trade-off between positive monitoring effect of OP units and tax-induced agency costs, I find that UPREIT's firm value
increases with the fraction of OP units, but the effect is significantly weaker for the UPREITs where insiders hold OP units. 相似文献
15.
We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability significantly affects investment; the majority presence of and increases in state ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints), measured by cash flow interacted with a dummy variable of majority ownership of the respective group, and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and under-investment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis. 相似文献
16.
A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well. 相似文献
17.
In the past few decades many countries have increased the presence of various forms of private sector involvement in airport ownership and management. This paper focuses on the financial performance of Italian airport companies. We present empirical evidence separately for two groups where public or private management majority prevails. The main findings indicate that companies with a private majority outperform the others in terms of financial indicators that are related to operating income. 相似文献
18.
《International Business Review》2020,29(4):101666
Empirical evidence for the relationship between host country risk and a firm’s ownership level in its foreign entry strategy is inconclusive. We revisit this relationship by integrating the internalisation logic with an institution-based view to examine the moderating effects of formal and informal institutions in the home country. By meta-analysing 64 empirical studies involving 52,229 ownership decisions on foreign market entry, this study gives support to theoretical arguments that the focal relationship is positively moderated by institutional constraints on policymakers and risk-taking tendencies in the home country but is negatively moderated by the joint effect of these two institutional factors. These findings shed new light on the literature of host country risk and foreign ownership strategy. Besides describing the implications of the findings for theory and practice, we discuss the agenda for future theory development in international business. 相似文献
19.
Using China as the research setting, this paper investigates the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical results show a U-shaped relation between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical analysis, in terms of ownership structure, firm size, corporate competitiveness and geographical location, further shows that (i) the effects for economic policy uncertainty in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are significant, but the effect is stronger for state-owned enterprises; (ii) such significant effect is also found more strongly in small and medium-sized enterprises and highly competitive enterprises; and (iii) the effects for eastern, central and western China are all statistically significant, but the effect is strongest for eastern China. 相似文献
20.
Cross-country studies document a negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings. In contrast, this relation is found to be positive in the United States. In this paper, we examine the case of Japanese firms. Using institutional ownership and cross-shareholdings as the main governance variables, we show that better governance is associated with higher cash balances as in the United States. The reason is that better-governed firms make better investment decisions. Their investments are not driven by excess liquidity and result in higher profitability and higher firm valuation. Overall, our findings indicate that management profligacy is a bigger concern to shareholders than management propensity to hoard cash because of risk aversion. 相似文献