Ownership concentration, voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry in New Zealand

This paper investigates the impact of different classes of ownership concentration on information asymmetry conditional upon corporate voluntary disclosures in New Zealand. The current paper attempts to extend this stream of research by incorporating three mutually exclusive ownership structures and considering the interactive relationship between such ownership structures and corporate voluntary disclosures. Results reveal that ownership concentration in general is significantly positively associated with bid-ask spreads (proxy for information asymmetry) observed around annual report release dates. This finding supports the adverse selection hypothesis and importantly this effect is found to be most pronounced for financial institutions and management-controlled ownership categories. When voluntary disclosure is taken into account, the findings demonstrate that disclosures significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk associated with ownership concentration. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structures. The findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures especially management-controlled ownership structures in reducing information asymmetry and enhancing market efficiency in New Zealand.     

试论农村信用社体制改革及路径选择

本文从农村信用社的民主管理制度本身进行探讨,研究民主管理制度与当前农村金融的相容性问题。本文的基本判断是：正如自由竞争可能导致垄断一样,合作制所体现的民主管理是一种一厢情愿的制度构想,其所导致的内部人控制是民主制的悖论。因此,如果要继续坚持农村信用社继续为“三农”服务的基本方向,必须在现实上放弃空想式的民主制度,近期实行治理结构的准国有化,远期实行所有制的民营化,并在整体金融领域实行“反向剪刀差”。     

控制股东的掏空行为与公司的股权结构及公司价值——基于双层委托代理模型的分析

本文构建了一个小股东、控制股东和经理人之间的双层委托代理理论分析框架来分析我国上市公司中同时存在的两类代理问题:股东与经理人的利益冲突以及控制股东与小股东的利益冲突。在此基础上着重研究了控制股东掏空行为与公司股权结构及公司价值之间的关系。通过分析指出:(1)均衡状态下,公司的所有权集中程度由公司股东所受投资者法律保护程度决定。随着投资者法律保护程度的增加,小股东最优的投资数量也会增加,公司的所有权结构趋于更加分散。(2)在公司的现金流所有权结构确定的情况下,由股东和经理人之间的信息非对称性引起的股东和经理人之间的利益冲突会减少公司价值,使得控制股东和小股东的利益均受到损害。控制股东掏空资产收益的比例随着其自身现金流所有权的增加而减少,随着其控制权和所有权之间的分离程度而增加,随着投资者法律保护的增加而减少。(3)相对于公司中仅仅存在股东和经理人之间的利益冲突的情形,控制股东的掏空行为会进一步降低公司的价值,而且降低的程度会随着控制股东的控制权和所有权的分离程度的增加而增加。(4)当控制股东完全不能进行掏空时,即使小股东仍然面临由于公司中的第Ⅰ类代理问题引起的利益损害,但均衡时,由于控制股东和小股东之间不存在利...     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.     

我国农村土地家庭承包经营权之物权性质

农村土地承包经营权的法律性质，究竟为物权抑或债权，在我国民法学界一直存有争论。本文结合我国新颁布的《农村土地承包法》的规定，认定家庭承包经营权具有物权的性质，但仍然存在一些问题，需要进一步改进。     

Exchange rates and ownership structure of Japanese multinational firms

This paper investigates the determinants of Japanese multinationals’ ownership structures. Unlike most previous studies that neglect the impact of financial constraints on ownership, we add the exchange rate as a measure of wealth and test whether exchange rates affect the ownership share of foreign direct investment projects. After controlling for other variables that affect ownership, we find that exchange rates have a significant effect on the likelihood of wholly owned subsidiaries. We also discuss several other explanations for the link between exchange rates and foreign direct investment and provide evidence that the link stems from capital-market imperfections.     

产权性质、融资约束与现金调整:兼论货币政策有效性

本文采用现金-现金流敏感度分析,通过2002年至2010年包括国际金融危机前后我国上市公司的样本,实证分析了金融危机外部冲击对不同产权性质企业现金持有及调整策略的影响,我们发现,在国际金融危机前,由于信贷歧视,民营上市公司的现金-现金流敏感度要高于国有上市公司;在国际金融危机的冲击下,由于银行信贷流向更不均衡以及政府财政刺激使得国有上市公司获得了更多的外部现金流,国有上市公司现金持有对公司内部产生的现金流敏感性进一步降低。通过动态调整模型的分析表明,在国际金融危机后,民营上市公司应对现金流动性变动的反应更强,现金持有向均值的调整积极性更高,因此,私人部门的现金策略行为在一定程度上缓解了对宏观经济的不利影响。     

异质机构、企业性质与关联交易

基于2007-2009年3618家A股上市公司数据,本文从关联交易密度和关联交易频率两个维度对机构持股、企业性质和关联交易之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现：机构持股对企业关联交易的抑制作用并不显著,这种不显著性主要归因于证券投资基金;不同性质的机构对企业关联交易的抑制作用不同,其中证券投资基金对企业关联交易基本不存在抑制作用,而险资和合格的境外机构投资者则相反;企业性质对异质机构和关联交易间的关系有显著的调节作用,民营上市公司中机构投资者的抑制作用要强于国有上市公司。     

关于公有经济收入差别倒U理论的讨论与验证(上)

在经济发展方式逐步从增长型向分配型、从生产型向消费型、从建设型向民生型转变的过程中,回顾和总结学术界关于居民收入分配差别的讨论显然是必要的。文章从多个方面回顾、分析和考察了"公有经济收入差别倒U理论"这一理论模型提出后的争论焦点及演变过程,包括围绕这一理论所讨论的主要内容,比如有关公有制经济与私有制经济条件的比较分析,有关劳动差别、劳动供求、剩余/生计比以及农村收入差别大于城镇差别等两部门内部各种因素的趋势、二元结构部门转换影响收入差别的讨论,有关国有资本积累及改革引起的民营资本积累、税收政策和体制改革对收入差别变动趋势的影响的讨论,以及这一理论在中国的验证等。分析表明,目前中国居民收入差别还在沿着公有经济收入差别倒U曲线的前半段逐步呈"阶梯形"上升,但上升的势头已经趋缓,并且个别方面比如城市化等因素导致的收入差别已经初现下降趋势。     

企业所有制结构与区域工业污染——基于我国2003～2009年的省级面板数据研究

本文采用广义矩估计(GMM)法,选取我国2003～2009年的省级面板数据,对国有企业、私营企业和外商港澳台企业与区域工业污染之间的关系进行实证研究。研究结果表明:国有企业、私营企业和外商港澳台企业的环境污染效应均为正,这三类企业的发展均会导致环境状况恶化;征收排污税可以改善环境,而工业污染源治理资金的投入却并未带来相应的环保效益。