基于绩效和社会福利的公司治理实证研究

本文从公司绩效和社会福利两个方面,对2010年不同性质12个行业的国内上市公司进行比较分析,发现国有企业的经营收入、资产和市场份额都要高于私有企业;在公司绩效指标上,不同行业不同指标衡量下比较结果不同;在社会福利指标上,大部分行业中国有企业均大于私有企业。如以盈利能力来衡量企业绩效,则国有企业和混合企业相对于私有企业会降低企业的绩效,表明私有企业更加关注绩效;如果以社会福利来衡量公司绩效,则国有企业和混合企业相对于私有企业会提高企业的绩效。     

Are Chinese trade flows different?

We find that Chinese trade flows respond to economic activity and relative prices – as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate – but the relationships are not always precisely or robustly estimated. Chinese exports are generally well-behaved, rising with foreign GDP and decreasing as the Chinese renminbi (RMB) appreciates. However, the estimated income elasticity is sensitive to the treatment of time trends. Estimates of aggregate imports are more problematic. In many cases, Chinese aggregate imports actually rise in response to an RMB depreciation and decline with Chinese GDP. This is true even after accounting for the fact a substantial share of imports are subsequently incorporated into Chinese exports. We find that some of these counter-intuitive results are mitigated when we disaggregate the trade flows by customs type, commodity type, and the type of firm undertaking the transactions. However, for imports, we only obtain more reasonable estimates of elasticities when we allow for different import intensities for different components of aggregate demand (specifically, consumption vs. investment) or when we include a relative productivity variable.     

中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效:基于随机前沿生产函数的分析

本文通过构建深圳中小企业板上市公司股权结构影响企业绩效的复合随机前沿生产函数,利用2006—2008年面板数据对中小企业的股权结构和企业绩效的关系进行了经验研究,结果表明中小企业的股权集中度与企业绩效之间显著正相关,这与国内文献中对大公司的经验研究结果一致,表明当前上市公司的股权集中有利于公司治理改善和企业绩效的提高。但是第一大股东持股比率却与绩效负相关,这与对大公司的研究结论相反,表明在中小企业中存在较为明显的"隧道挖掘"现象,"一股独大"在中小企业中并不利于公司治理。研究结果还表明,国家、法人、外资或个人对公司治理的绩效无显著差异;流通股比重、高管持股、研发人员投入等都与企业绩效不相关;中小企业具有较强的股权融资倾向,不符合"啄食顺序"的资本结构理论。     

外商直接投资溢出效应的所有制差异研究——基于国有企业与其他所有制企业的比较分析

笔者利用制造业23个子行业2003年～2007年的面板数据,具体区分FDI对我国国有企业和其他所有制企业的溢出效应①的差异。结果表明:外资的进入对国有企业产生显著的正向竞争效应和非显著的负向示范效应,其他所有制企业由于自身条件的限制,主要通过与国有企业的竞争提高劳动生产率。     

所有权结构对我国银行业绩的影响研究

本文运用我国29家银行2000-2010年业绩及所有权结构指标定量地衡量了所有权结构对银行的盈利能力、资产质量和净利润增长率产生的静态效应、选择效应和动态效应。研究结果表明,在静态效应方面,业绩最优的是城市商业银行;在选择效应方面,被选择进行股份制改革的银行之前业绩较差,被境外投资者选择的银行之前业绩则较好;在动态效应方面,股份制改革和公开上市有利于银行资本充足率的提升。最后本文提出发展城市商业银行体系、健全现代化经营管理体制、规范并加强资本充足率的管理、引入战略投资者以优化银行所有权结构、促进银行业绩增长等建议。     

Capital Structure,Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis

This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.     

The Role of Investment,Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain

This paper analyses the determinants of ownership structure by focusing on the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions. The use of the Generalised Method of Moments allows us to provide new evidence on this important corporate governance topic, since it controls for the endogeneity problem. Our most relevant findings show that: i) increases in debt lead insiders to limit the risk they bear by reducing their holdings; ii) monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt; and iii) both inside and outside owners are encouraged to increase their stakes in the firm in view of higher dividends. Our results hold after controlling for equity issues and share repurchases.     

Audit effort and fees under concentrated client ownership: Evidence from four international audit firms

Using proprietary audit hour and fee data from the internal records of four Big Six firms in Finland, this study examines the influence of audit client ownership type on audit effort and fees. The primary argument is that there are differential effects of ownership concentration depending on the particular nature of concentrated ownership (i.e., firms in which the majority of shares are manager-owned versus foreign-owned versus state-owned). Consistent with this, the paper documents that audit hours and fees are lower for companies majority-owned by their management and higher for subsidiaries of foreign companies than for other firms. However, no difference between companies owned by the state or municipalities and companies with a more diverse ownership structure can be found. This suggests that governmental ownership is actually closer to a dispersed than a concentrated ownership structure in terms of audit quality.The results show that replacing the variable indicating majority-ownership with the variables capturing the type of a controlling owner increases the explanatory power of the models significantly, which demonstrates the importance of ownership type in the production and pricing of an audit. The findings have important implications for those examining audit markets with client firms owned by different types of controlling shareholders.     

Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existing literature offers two alternative perspectives on the behavior of such owner-manager firms, convergence of interests, and management entrenchment hypotheses. We tested the alternative views to see how they are reflected in earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase, supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager structure. Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders. On the one hand, institutions/blockholders have incentives to actively monitor management. However, on the other hand, institutions/blockholders may not render effective monitoring because they lack expertise, suffer from freerider problems, or strategically ally with management. These opposing views predict conflicting signs on the relation between the earnings informativeness and holdings of institutions/blockholders. We find that earnings informativeness increases with the holdings of institutions and blockholders. This supports the active monitoring role of institutions/blockholders. Finally, we test the relationship between earnings informativeness for chaebol (Korean business group)-affiliated companies vs. that for nonchaebol-affiliated companies, and find no significant relationship between the owner-largest shareholder's holdings and earnings informativeness. This provides evidence that for chaebol companies, the negative effect of management entrenchment/expropriation of minority shareholders offsets the positive effects. This phenomenon is stronger for chaebol-affiliated companies than for nonchaebol affiliates.     

The private placement of bank equity

This paper investigates the role of private placements of common stock as a source of bank capital. Our results show that information asymmetry problems that typically attend new offers of bank equity are mitigated in the private placement process. Moreover buyers of privately placed common stock seem to provide a quality certification of capital deficient bank holding companies. Our evidence is also consistent with the notion that buyers of privately placed common stock provide a monitoring service that aligns the interest of the bank's managers and shareholders. Finally, we find no evidence that private placements are predominately motivated by incumbent management's attempts to sell equity to a friendly buyer at the expense of the bank's current shareholders.