Automation and inequality with taxes and transfers

Declines in low-skill labour shares are reviewed, and a stylised model is constructed to examine their determinants and future implications. A retrospective analysis of US shocks suggests that technological change has contributed more to raising income inequality and the wealth to GDP ratio than other changes. An anticipated future twist away from low-skill labour toward the capital, combined with population growth, risks high unemployment rates. Productivity growth at twice the pace since 1990 limits this, though inequality persists. Analysis shows that a generalisation of the US ‘earned income tax credit’ system with consumption tax outperforms alternatives of the ‘universal basic income’.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.     

Valuation with share repurchases and personal taxes

We derive a consistent valuation approach that integrates the interdependent effects of cash dividends, share repurchases and active debt management while considering personal taxes. The valuation approach is based on the assumption that a predetermined proportion of the flow to equity is used for share repurchases instead of cash dividends. Additionally, we examine the effects of share repurchases on the cost of equity by deriving appropriate adjustment formulae. Furthermore, we run simulations to investigate the valuation differences caused by the distribution of excess cash via cash dividends or share repurchases. The results show that share repurchases have a significant positive effect on equity market value.     

Personal taxes,cost of insurer equity capital,and the case of offshore hedge fund reinsurers

Insurer investment returns are taxed in the United States at the corporate level and at the personal level when they are distributed to shareholders. This paper examines the implications of personal taxes for the tax cost on insurers equity capital and how these tax costs have varied over time under different tax regimes and with different asset portfolios. The paper also discusses how personal taxes provide tax incentives to form offshore hedge fund reinsurers, which provide an interesting case study illustrating the relevance of personal taxes. Finally, the paper discusses the tax treatment of alternative capital arrangements, such as collateralized reinsurance and sidecars.     

Heterogeneity in property tax capitalization: Evidence from municipalities in Wisconsin

This article provides evidence that higher property taxes usually decrease property value. On average, a 10% increase in property taxes decreases property value by more than 0.34%. To control for school quality and related sorting, we estimate within-school-district property tax impacts. The effective cost of services (driven by appraisal errors or tax code changes), preferences for local services, and the elasticity of supply of housing all play an important role in determining whether property taxes increase or decrease house prices. Locally produced and consumed municipal services such as trash collection are positively capitalized.