Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments

The paper surveys political macroeconomics, covering its development from Rogoff's conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design. Topics include the inflation-stabilization trade-off, central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs, inflation targets, performance contracts for monetary authorities, and the consequences of output persistence for these issues. Further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent, the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy, the government spending bias, and the game-theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. All work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework.     

从中、日企业的成长环境看全球金融危机对两国企业的影响

试图从政治经济、社会文化以及企业内部运作机制的差异使全球金融危机对中日两国企业不同程度的影响进行比较,以期为中国企业顺利度过危机提供借鉴。     

地区本位的新政治经济学分析

本文从新政治经济学角度，对中国经济转型过程中出现的地区本位现象进行了分析。建立了一个综合本地区居民福利、本地区生产企业福利、政府职能代理人（官员和公务员）本身的利益以及本地区政府财政收入四大块组成地区总福利函数模型．并解出了最优市场保护率。分析认为．地区本位现象的出现是地方政府基于多种利益关系考虑而实施的一种不合理却是必然的举措。     

Incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections

This paper presents a mechanism to mitigate the adverse consequences of the political budget cycle on social welfare. We use a simplified two-period version of Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80, 21–36.] rational budget cycle model to address the normative issue of reducing the budget deficit in pre-electoral periods. A regulation consisting of a sanction scheme contingent on fiscal policy joint with a fixed transfer is shown to provide the appropriate incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections.     

Multi-path mapping for alignment strategies in emerging science and technologies

Roadmapping serves both short and long term (strategic) alignment in science and technology (S&T). Forecasts of the likely future development of S&T are generated; then research and development (R&D) efforts necessary to realize various goals are backcast. But for new and emerging S&T this trusted principle does not work: the likely products are not articulated yet. A promising approach however is building mapping tools based on underlying patterns and indicators of the dynamics of emergence. This paper discusses, based on a first round application in the field of micro and nanotechnologies for single cell analysis, the methodology of such a new approach. The work is linked to a programme of Future oriented Technology Assessment (FTA) activities coordinated within a European nanotechnology research network.

Our paper addresses well-known lacunae of alignment tools from the viewpoints of the path creation/dependency literatures. We then apply these insights to lab-on-a-chip devices for cell analysis. Dynamics of emerging paths can be used to articulate a future structured in terms of prospective innovation chains and potential paradigms. We demonstrate a plausible variety of paths, which provides a broader set of strategic choices. This enables management of expectations and hype by which emerging S&T are characterised, and leads to alignment of actors. Our tool can be applied in strategic management of research and R&D at the level of science-to-industry networks. These are becoming an important element in European S&T policy but will only be successful if ways are found for closing gaps in the innovation chain.     

Politicians’ motivation,political culture,and electoral competition

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78     

Issues in New Political Economy: An Overview

A brief overview of the historical background, nature, and rapid growth in volume and scope of new political economy since the early 1980s is provided. the paper continues with some general reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the new political economy approach, illustrated by the other contributions to this special issue of the Journal of Economic Surveys . The final Section summarises these contributions.     

Cooperative ventures in emerging economies

Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow.