地区本位的新政治经济学分析

本文从新政治经济学角度，对中国经济转型过程中出现的地区本位现象进行了分析。建立了一个综合本地区居民福利、本地区生产企业福利、政府职能代理人（官员和公务员）本身的利益以及本地区政府财政收入四大块组成地区总福利函数模型．并解出了最优市场保护率。分析认为．地区本位现象的出现是地方政府基于多种利益关系考虑而实施的一种不合理却是必然的举措。     

Incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections

This paper presents a mechanism to mitigate the adverse consequences of the political budget cycle on social welfare. We use a simplified two-period version of Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80, 21–36.] rational budget cycle model to address the normative issue of reducing the budget deficit in pre-electoral periods. A regulation consisting of a sanction scheme contingent on fiscal policy joint with a fixed transfer is shown to provide the appropriate incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections.     

Politicians’ motivation,political culture,and electoral competition

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78     

Issues in New Political Economy: An Overview

A brief overview of the historical background, nature, and rapid growth in volume and scope of new political economy since the early 1980s is provided. the paper continues with some general reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the new political economy approach, illustrated by the other contributions to this special issue of the Journal of Economic Surveys . The final Section summarises these contributions.     

Cooperative ventures in emerging economies

Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow.     

Are stock prices related to the political uncertainty index in OECD countries? Evidence from the bootstrap panel causality test

This study applies the bootstrap panel causality test proposed by Kónya (2006. Econ Modell 23, 978) to investigate the causal link between political uncertainty and stock prices for seven OECD countries over the monthly period of 2001.01 to 2013.04. This modeling approach allows us to examine both cross-sectional dependency and country-specific heterogeneity. Our empirical results indicate that not all the countries are alike and that the theoretical prediction that stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy change is not always supported. Specifically, we find evidence for the stock price leading hypothesis for Italy and Spain, while the political uncertainty leading hypothesis cannot be rejected for the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, the neutrality hypothesis was supported in the remaining three countries (Canada, France and Germany), while no evidence for the feedback hypothesis was found.     

Does corporate philanthropy exist?: business giving to the arts in the U.K.

This paper addresses the question of the existence of corporate philanthropy. It proposes a framework for analysing corporate philanthropy along the dimensions of business/society interest and primary/secondary stakeholder focus. The framework is then applied in order to understand business involvement with the arts in the U.K. A unique dataset of 60 texts which describe different firms' involvement with the Arts is analysed using formal content analysis to uncover the motivations for business involvement. Cluster analysis is then used in order to identify motivational groupings. Two broad types of involvement are identified – advertisers and legitimators. Only in one case of the 60 is there the potential to observe pure altruism. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a clear framework to understand the motivations for corporate giving and applies this using empirical data. Secondly, this research finds little evidence, if at all, of corporate philanthropy in the context of firms giving to the Arts in the U.K.     

Protection and jobs: explaining the structure of trade barriers across industries

This paper develops a model of protection and tests it using US data, including new protection measures. We find that protection in an industry increases with its employment but not with its level of output. We also find that lobbying entails significant transactions costs. We have limited evidence that industry characteristics, such as the number of firms and geographical concentration, affect protection. Nested tests imply that assuming lump-sum rebating of import revenues or rents is justified. The results also suggest that US policy makers weight a dollar of campaign contributions about 15% more heavily than a dollar of national income.     

Trade and the distribution of human capital

We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. We also look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the voting outcome.     

Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements

In a bargaining model of endogenous protection, I introduce fixed costs of political-organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying. Unlike Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [J. Pol. Econ. 106(3) (1998) 575] intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed. Nevertheless, I am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis-à-vis the import-competing lobby precommits to a free-trade agreement. Further, with high fixed organizational costs, the government prefers to stay out of such agreements. Its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse-V-shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs.