苏州金融发展与经济增长关系的实证分析

文章依据金融与经济关系的原理,采用实证分析的方法论证苏州金融发展与经济增长关系,在此基础上做出合理的解释。     

青年学生政治信仰危机之哲学探析

青年学生中"政治信仰危机"现象日渐严重使得高校马克思主义信仰培养教育受到严峻的挑战与冲击。危机的发生既有学理根源,也有现实原因。我们应予以梳理,并从社会环境、马克思主义理论建设和信仰教育改革等方面寻求对策。     

高职院校校园文化建设的问题及对策

从阐述高职院校加强校园文化建设的必要性入手,文章指出高职院校校园文化建设中存在的问题,进而提出了加强高职院校校园文化建设的对策建议。     

Earnings Management in Response to the Introduction of the Australian Gold Tax*

Earnings from gold mining in Australia remained tax‐exempt for almost seven decades until January 1, 1991. In the early 1980s, rapid economic prosperity induced by escalated gold prices brought the Australian gold‐mining industry under intense political scrutiny. Using a variant of the modified Jones model, this paper provides evidence of significant downward earnings management by Australian gold‐mining firms, which is consistent with their attempts to mitigate political costs during the period from June 1985 to May 1988. In contrast, test of earnings management over a similar period in a control sample of Canadian gold‐mining firms produced insignificant results. Further, empirical results are robust to several sensitivity tests performed. During the period from June 1988 to December 1990, the Australian firms were found to have engaged in economic earnings management. This is consistent with the sample firms' incentive of maximizing economic earnings immediately prior to the introduction of income tax on gold mining. The findings of this study help to understand the impact of earnings management on the efficient resource allocation in an economy. They also contribute toward understanding the linkage between regulation of accounting for special purposes and general‐purpose financial reporting.     

Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view

Almost all the literature on the evolution of the financial supervision architecture stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the recent trend toward more unification. But in the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features matter. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship, focusing on the political cost and benefit analysis. First, a cross-country study tests two alternative theories—the helping hand and the grabbing hand view of government—to determine the impact of the market structure on the supervisory setting. Our evidence seems more consistent with the grabbing hand view, considering the degree of banking concentration a proxy of the capture risk and presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, the results of a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirm a market preference for a more consolidated supervisory regime but reveal only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and those of the market operators.     

Political economy of income distribution dynamics

Income distribution varies considerably across countries; it tends to become more equal with development in some countries, but just the opposite occurs in other countries. This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the persistent differences in income distribution across countries over time. Motivated by the relationship between income distribution and public spending at different school levels for a broad range of countries over the past 30 years, the analysis centers on the role of public education where specific investments interact with political involvement by different socio-economic groups. Socio-economic groups may form lobbies to influence education policy making. The formation of lobbies is endogenous. Persistent inequality is caused by persistent lobbying efforts of the wealthy that lead to an allocation of public education spending more biased toward them.     

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY: FROM PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY

Abstract.  We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing state-owned enterprises with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain.