How algorithmic cultural recommendation influence the marketing of cultural collections

Museums make their collections available online to keep pace with developments in how people access and share information. While museums have traditionally understood the notion of public access as part of their institutional remit, in this paper I draw on policy documents and qualitative interviews with Australasian cultural professionals, to examine how the discourse of access might account for the museum’s transformation from a community space to a resource that is beneficial to marketers. I use Google Arts & Culture as a case study, to suggest the terms of public access have altered to adapt to the needs of commercial “digital enclosures.” When people engage with the museum in virtual spaces data are collected. Algorithms work as a set of instructions that make it possible to search, sort and organise the data, linking together people and their online practices in order to enact a form of algorithmic cultural recommendation.     

构建适应新时代要求的干部教育培训体系研究

科学的干部教育培训体系是提高干部教育培训质量的必备条件,正确看待新形势下干部教育培训工作的不足和问题,科学构建先进培训理念体系、科学培训教学体系、规范培训质量体系和管用培训考核体系是各级干部教育培训机构努力的方向。     

法国现行知识产权权属及利益分配政策简析

法国是世界科技强国之一,科研与创新体系完善。法国国立科研机构是科研的主力军,创造了大量的知识产权。专利作为保护科研工作中知识产权的一种突出形式,其带来的直接经济效益和间接影响,为法国科技可持续发展的保驾护航起到举足轻重的作用。本文旨在从法国国立科研机构的角度介绍法国知识产权政策,尤其是对职务发明的权属认定和利益分配的优点进行浅析。     

事业单位岗位设置实施后存在的问题及对策

对事业单位进行岗位设置,就是要打破传统的用人模式,通过采用合同聘用制等方式,引入竞争机制,逐步形成规范、合理、高效的用人机制,激发广大事业单位的工作积极性,主动投入事业单位高效便民服务中,将事业单位的职能充分发挥出来。这是深化事业单位人事改革的重要举措,是事业单位全面有效改革实现的关键和重点。因此,分析和研究事业单位岗位设置实施后存在的问题,以及进一步解决出现的问题非常重要。     

Thorstein Veblen’s Financial Macroeconomics

The purpose of this article is to provide an exposition of Thorstein Veblen’s contribution to financial macroeconomics. I argue that Veblen conceptualizes and contextualizes how the financial structure of effective demand is predisposed to endogenous non-sustainable leverage processes, manipulation, and speculation. I stress that Veblen advances a cultural-financial theory of investment and brings forward the role that pecuniary and emulation instincts play in institutionalizing predatory and fraudulent activities which destabilize the macroevolution of monetary production economies. I underline that Veblen patterns financial macroeconomic fragility and instability within the institutions of the business enterprise system.     

Learning about challengers

We examine a political agency problem in repeated elections where an incumbent runs against a challenger from the opposing party, whose policy preferences are unknown by voters. We first ask: do voters benefit from attracting a pool of challengers with more moderate ideologies? When voters and politicians are patient, moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians (those close to the median voter) reduces voter welfare by reducing an extreme incumbent's incentives to compromise. We then ask: do voters benefit from informative signals about a challenger's true ideology? We prove that giving voters informative, but sufficiently noisy, signals always harm voters, because they make it harder for incumbents to secure re-election.     

A comparative political economic analysis of maize sector policies in eastern and southern Africa

Maize sector policies in eastern and southern Africa are characterized by a large and often growing presence of the state. Yet the scope, scale, and modalities of state activities vary substantially across countries. Drawing on data from Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, and Mozambique this article compares the relative degree of state intervention in the maize sector. We show that relative preferences for output market subsidies, input market subsidies, trade restrictions, or non-interventionist approaches reflect the interplay of interest group lobbying, patronage networks, and ethnic and regional political affiliations. These relationships have deep historical roots and have often been intensified in the context of the emergence of multiparty politics. We show that interventionist orientations in output markets and trade do not translate into better performance or welfare outcomes. Input subsidy preferences produce more ambiguous welfare results, when the opportunity costs are not fully accounted for.     

Banks' Use of Accounting Discretion and Regulatory Intervention: The Case of European Banks' Impairments on Greek Government Bonds

This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.