Pollution,mortality and time consistent abatement taxes

We study dynamically consistent policy in a neoclassical overlapping generations growth model where pollution externalities undermine health but are mitigated via tax-financed abatement. With arbitrarily constant taxation, two steady states arise: an unstable ‘poverty trap’ and a ‘neoclassical’ steady state near which the dynamics might either be monotonically convergent or oscillating. When the planner chooses a time consistent abatement path that maximizes a weighted intergenerational sum of expected utility, the optimal tax is zero at low levels of capital and then a weakly increasing function of the capital stock. The non-homogeneity of the tax function along with its feedback effect on savings induces additional steady states, stability reversals and oscillations.     

Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?*

We suggest a novel perspective on the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a political economy model with imperfect product market competition where local and foreign firms jointly lobby the local government for a favorable pollution tax. FDI is found to affect environmental policy, and the effect is conditional on the local government's degree of corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is sufficiently high (low), FDI leads to less (more) stringent environmental policy, and FDI thus contributes to (mitigates) the creation of a pollution haven. Our empirical results using panel data from 33 countries support the predictions of the model.     

Industrial Pollution Linkages in North America: A Linear Analysis

In recent years, a surge of interest in the linkages between trade and the environment has occurred in the contexts of both regional and multilateral trade agreements. In this paper, we utilize a three-country, social accounting matrix (SAM) of the North American economy and data from the World Bank's Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) to conduct a linear multiplier analysis of industrial pollution linkages in North America. We provide estimates of both direct and indirect inter-country effects for a detailed set of industrial pollutants. The strongest linkages occur in the petroleum, chemicals, paper, base metals, and transportation equipment sectors.     

Environmental innovation policy and international competition

We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms.     

International aspects of pollution control

Pollution is a by-product of production, is only gradually dissolved by the environment, and crosses national borders. The market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution. In practice, governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra-national social planning. Absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges, less cleaning-up activities and more pollution. Appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis. Attention is also paid to investment in clean technology. The debate between optimists, who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy, and pessimists can be analysed in this way.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the EAERE conference Environmental Cooperation and Policy in the Single European Market, Venice, Italy, 17–20 April, 1990, and the CentER conference Economics of the Environment, Tilburg, The Netherlands, 17–19 September, 1990. The paper has benefitted from the comments of the participants of these conferences, and particularly of the detailed comments of Henk Folmer and Ignazio Musu.     

Environmental regulation and MNEs location: Does CSR matter?

We investigate whether firms with relatively low environmental standards are more often located in countries that are poor, corrupt or have weak environmental regulations. We find new empirical evidence in favor of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, which states that MNEs are transferring their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation. Our findings suggest that these are not necessarily the poorest or most corrupt countries. We establish that MNEs with strong social responsibility avoid locating their operations in countries with weak environmental regulation.     

我国经济发展与环境污染空间分布关系的实证检验

本文提出了一种新的分析重心移动的方法,即根据区域属性值的特征量来分析重心移动。本文应用这种方法,对1985年至2009年期间我国环境污染重心移动的轨迹、原因及影响因素进行了理论与实证分析。研究结果发现：我国环境污染重心与相应污染变量、环境污染影响因素的总量和方差之间存在显著影响关系,而与相应污染变量、环境污染影响因素的变化速度之间的影响关系不显著。本文的研究结论对于有效管理我国环境污染、提升经济发展质量具有重要的意义。     

环保产业发展与区域环境质量改善——来自省级面板数据的证据

环保产业能够通过技术效应、替代效应、直接效应、环保意识和环境管制标准提升等途径来改善环境质量。对我国30个省份的面板数据进行的实证研究发现,环保产业发展确实能够改善区域环境质量,但是目前其对不同污染物排放有着不同的影响力度,其对整体环境质量和工业废水排放的改善作用较为明显,但对固体废物和废气排放的影响并不显著。环保产业改善环境质量的力度和广度都还没有充分展示出来,这与其目前的总体规模和水平相称。     

Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach

Summary. We consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly. We demonstrate that optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property selective penalization. Our Optimal Distortion Theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a higher tax rate. Our Pro-concentration Motive Theorem states that optimal taxes increase the concentration of the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl index. Our Magnification Effect indicates that the variance of marginal costs is magnified by a factor which depends on the marginal cost of public funds.JEL Classification Numbers: Q20, D60, D63.We wish to thank Peter Neary, Kim Long, Raymond Riezman and a referee for very helpful comments. Financial support from SSHRC and FCAR are gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Hassan Benchekroun, Kim Long, and Koji Shimomura for discussions and comments.     

The costs of tax havens: evidence from industry-level data

ABSTRACT

Multinational enterprises make use of tax havens to avoid paying corporate income taxes and this costs 100 billion USD and more in lost government revenue worldwide according to an increasing number of recent studies. None of those studies assigns these costs to industries. I aim to shed more light on this gap by using some of the best available industry-level US data to determine to what extent the location of the MNEs’ profit is aligned with the location of their economic activities. My first finding is that the most important tax havens for US multinational enterprises are the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg (all EU member states). Second, I systematically identify the specific industries in specific tax havens responsible for the costs, which should be useful information for tax authorities aiming to reduce tax avoidance. Finally, I argue that the current data are not detailed enough to provide a reliable industry breakdown of the costs, but the prospect of combining input-output tables with forthcoming country-by-country data seems more promising.