产权制度的起源与禀赋效应

产权制度的起源是经济理论的重大议题之一。当违背产权契约的收益大于成本时,个体便有可能不尊重产权而导致群体面临典型的社会困境。自然的演化过程如何化解这样的困境便成了重要的研究问题。我们在鹰一鸽博弈的基础上引入禀赋效应,通过构建相应模型并进行计算机仿真发现,尊重产权的策略能够在演化压力下获得优势并扩散至整个群体。我们的研究表明,人类的产权制度可以在自发的演化过程中得以建立和维护。     

日本出版产业困境解析

战后日本的出版产业,从1955年至1975年以2位数高速增长,1976-1996年增长率减为1位数,1996年后发生重大变化,10年9降,前所未有。这既与日本经济的泡沫危机相生相伴,又与日本社会的发展及出版产业自身矛盾的累积息息相关。固然有读者需求日益多样化、畅销书发行册数大幅度减少等原因,但最根本的还是因日本整体经济长期低迷徘徊,造成大批读者因对前途失望而对出版物变得漠不关心。日本人口出生率连年下降、产业内部结构不合理等也给出版业的发展带来诸多不利因素。此外,近年来兴起的网络和"手机热"、公益图书馆的发展也给出版业带来了很大冲击。同时,流通渠道的垄断也长期困扰日本出版产业的发展。     

流动性过剩与流动性悖论

造成当前流动性过剩的一个重要原因是由于我国存在着一种"流动性悖论".而造成流动性悖论的原因又可以上溯到国内金融结构的体制性缺陷,具体包括银行体系、资本市场、人民币汇率制度和资本账户管制等四个方面的结构性问题.要根本上解决国际收支"双顺差"以及流动性悖论,长期看需要从经济与金融结构层面进行调整,近期则主要是汇率的调整,取消强制结汇制以及加强周边国家(地区)的政策协调.     

Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures

This paper conductsan experiment to investigate the economic effect of public disclosureswithin a multi-move adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.The game, which has multiple equilibria, is characterized by:(1) a stochastic endpoint, (2) random, repeated pairings withanonymous partners, and (3) public disclosures concerning thecurrent partner's previous strategies. In the experiment, cooperationis improved by the disclosures. In addition, subjects cooperatemore frequently when encountering a player who has tended tocooperate in the past, and less frequently when encounteringa player who has tended to defect in the past. Delayed disclosureleads to levels of cooperation only slightly less than thoseobtained with timely disclosure.     

基于策略、成本的移动机制对合作的影响

面对一般意义的社会合作困境,基于合作的演化理论成为经济学、生物学和社会学中重要的研究内容。本文在二维方格上的囚徒困境博弈中引入一个基于策略与成本的移动机制,通过计算机仿真模拟了行为群体的动态演化过程。结果表明：基于策略与成本的移动机制在较广的参数空间内提高了合作水平;同时,模型逻辑也揭示其主要原因在于两个方面,其一,基于策略的移动机制有效地促进了网络中合作者团块的涌现,为合作者的出现提供了有利的条件;另一方面,基于成本的移动有效地调节了主体移动的速率。合作者团块的出现增加了合作者的收益进而减少了背叛者寻找合作者的速率,为稳定的合作秩序的演化提供了有利的保证。     

商业判断规则的法经济学分析

由于董事商业决策的结果具有不确定性,法律机制介入董事商业决策既不准确而且成本高昂。商业判断规则作为董事决策行为的"安全港",在制度设计上应将司法审查限制在决策程序而非内容上,使董事拥有充分的决策自由裁量权,增进整个市场的经济效率。     

浅谈如何走出城乡居民大病保险的困境

本文对城乡居民大病保险运行现状进行整体分析认为,当前大病保险存在经营状况疲态、效率不足等问题,本质原因是大病保险定位不明,也源自制度设计公平不足,政策与市场选择矛盾和监管缺位,政府需要从制度设计、严格监管与引导民众等方面做好基础性安排,保险公司则需要优化大病保险承保模式,重视中长期规划等方面推进大病保险运行.     

Experimental study of repeated team-games

We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164–212, 1995) support this interpretation.     

获益不对称情景下的群体间合作行为研究

掌握获益不对称群体间合作行为规律可为大量的此类合作实践提供指导。在群体内和群体间过程不能割裂的认识下,群体间自发合作本质上是个体、个体所在群体、群体间所形成嵌套社会困境下的全局公共品贡献行为。通过行为经济学理论、嵌套社会困境多公共品实验室实验对获益不对称群体间合作行为进行分析和检验发现:（1）合作环境具有宽归集、内群体偏向行为特点;（2）在交互中,不公平厌恶和互惠两类条件合作的出现和叠加使此类合作从开始到持续不同于获益对称情形;（3）高水平、更稳定的群体间合作可出现于温和程度的不对称情形。该结果表明行为因素可为促进获益不对称群体间合作实践提供新途径。     

Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

We report results from an experiment that examines play in an indefinitely repeated, two-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. Each experimental session involves N subjects and a sequence of indefinitely repeated games. The main treatment consists of whether agents are matched in fixed pairings or matched randomly in each indefinitely repeated game. Within the random matching treatment, we elicit player's strategies and beliefs or vary the information that players have about their opponents. Contrary to a theoretical possibility suggested by Kandori [1992. Social norms and community enforcement. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59, 63–80], a cooperative norm does not emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. On the other hand, in the fixed pairings treatment, the evidence suggests that a cooperative norm does emerge as players gain more experience.