服务型政府行政权力运行机制困境及完善

服务型政府是我国此次行政管理体制改革的基本着眼点之一。当前建设服务型政府过程中政府行政权力运行面l临的诸多问题,主要是行政权力在社会权力中的地位以及行政权力内部设置没有理顺。必须完善地方政府行政权力运行机制,政府对社会市场干涉有度,规范行政权力运行程序,合理分配社会权力。     

构建“简政强镇”改革的实现机制:基于改革困境的考量

简政强镇改革,使乡镇经济社会管理职能由权小责大向权责一致转变,已经取得了实质性的进展。但这一改革仍面临着诸多的困境。因此,必须从形成改革共识、理顺行政体制、转变职能定位、保障执法权威以及加强权力监管等方面构建简政强镇改革的实现机制,才能从体制和法制上保障改革的顺利进行。     

Let's make a deal in the classroom: Institutional solutions to the Monty Hall Dilemma

The authors describe how the Monty Hall Dilemma, a well-known choice anomaly, can be demonstrated with a simple and versatile classroom experiment. In addition to demonstrating the anomaly, the experiment can be used to introduce students to some institutional modifications that have been shown to ameliorate it. This experiment, which can be tailored by instructors to meet specific learning objectives for a variety of courses, can also be used to frame broader discussions about rationality, institutions, and choices under uncertainty.     

资产减值会计：制度变迁、理论透析及实施困境

资产减值会计对于真实反映企业资产价值和披露企业经营业绩具有积极意义。本文在简要梳理国外及我国资产减值会计制度变迁过程的基础上,透析了资产减值会计的若干理论问题,探讨了资产减值会计实施中存在的困境与面临的挑战,并就完善资产减值会计提出了建议。     

关于科学发展观的逻辑思考

马克思关于发展的世界观是唯物的,关于发展的方法论是辩证的,马克思提出的发展的世界观和方法论是科学发展的抽象形式和最高境界.科学发展观无疑是好的发展观,但在贯彻落实这一发展观过程中却现实地存在着认识上、理论上、体制上诸多方面的误解和障碍,形成科学发展上的"博弈困境".     

Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules

Abstract.  The paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of New Institutional Economics analyses investigating a common-pool resource setting, with a specific focus on game theory models. Most of the studies have used a noncooperative approach in order to explain how under-provision for the resource or its over-use – the so-called Tragedy of the Commons – can be avoided, within given management rules. They show how the characteristics of the game (payoff matrix, repetition) or of the users (group size, wealth, heterogeneity and moral norms) may give incentives for the latter to play in a way that benefits all users. By contrast, much fewer articles have used a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to design new rules to overcome the initial Tragedy of the Commons. The article ends with some proposals of directions for future research.     

Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility

In the Passing the Buck game, the n members of a group decide in a given order whether or not to incur costs so that they can fix a certain problem for the benefit of the group. Passing the Buck means that one relies on the service of a successor. The decision is influenced by social preferences and by strategic considerations. We derive three main conclusions from experiments with n=3 and n=4. (i) The unique perfect Baysian equilibrium of the Passing the Buck game with incomplete information about the preferences of other players generally fits the data, however with two interesting exceptions. (ii) Backward induction breaks down if it requires more than two steps, i.e., for the first player in the game with n=4. (iii) Making one of the members of the group an “expert” who alone is competent to fix the problem is connected with a change of social preferences.     

Towards a framework for the elicitation of dilemmas

This paper covers the main findings of the doctoral research that was concerned with seeking to extend aspects of dilemma theory. In professional practice, the Trompenaars Hampden-Turner Dilemma Reconciliation Process^TM is a vehicle delivering dilemma theory in application. It informs a manager or leader on how to explore the dilemmas they face, how to reconcile the tensions that result, and how to structure the action steps for implementing the reconciled solutions. This vehicle forms the professional practice of the author who seeks to bring more rigor to consulting practice and thereby also contribute to theory development in the domain. The critical review of dilemma theory reveals that previous authors are inconsistent and variously invalid in their use of the terms ‘dilemma theory,’ ‘dilemma methodology,’ ‘dilemma process,’ ‘dilemma reconciliation,’ etc., and therefore an attempt is made to resolve these inconsistencies by considering whether ‘dilemmaism’ at the meta-level might be positioned as a new paradigm of inquiry for (management) research that embodies ontological, epistemological, and methodical premises that frame an approach to the resolution of real world business problems in (multi) disciplinary; (multi) functional and (multi) cultural business environments. This research offers contributions to knowledge, professional practice and theory development from the exploration of the SPID model as a way to make the elicitation of dilemmas more rigorous and structured and in the broader context of exploring ‘dilemmaism’ as a new paradigm of inquiry.     

国际银行监管合作中集体行动困境的博弈分析

国际经济合作中,集体行动困境现象随处可见。根据奥尔森的观点,由于搭便车倾向的普遍存在,个体理性不是集体理性的充分条件。本文试图回答这样一个问题,即以巴塞尔新旧资本协议为监管框架的国际银行监管合作是如何走出集体行动困境的?本文借鉴了博弈论分析框架,以巴塞尔新旧资本协议的历史演变为主线,分析了美、欧、日三方在实施国际银行监管规则中的博弈。最后,对国际银行监管合作的前景进行了展望,并对中国银行业实施新资本协议的相关策略提出了政策建议。     

金融危机对日本经济的影响及其政策的两难困境

2007年以来,日本经济受国际金融危机的冲击,景气扩张阶段终结并出现了深度的衰退,本文分析了金融危机背景下日本经济深度调整和日本经济政策选择的困境以及在这种形势下的现实选择。