Credit risk and asymmetric information: A simplified approach

We present a simple model for risky, corporate debt. Debtholders and equityholders have incomplete information about the financial state of the debt issuing company. Information is incomplete because it is delayed for all agents, and it is asymmetrically distributed between debtholders and equityholders. We solve for the equityholders' optimal default policy and for the credit spreads required by debtholders. Delayed information accelerates the equityholders' optimal decision to default. Interestingly, this effect is small, implying only a small impact on credit spreads. Asymmetric information, however, has a major impact on credit spreads. Our model predicts high credit spreads for short-term debt, as observed empirically in credit markets.     

基于GIS的工商管理信息系统的设计与实现

由于我国的工商管理涉及的地域较为广泛,而且业务流程极其复杂繁琐,尤其是基层工商管理部门,面对的营业户口不仅数量巨大,而且区域也十分广泛。所以,这就对我国的工商管理信息系统提出了较高的要求,需要为工商管理部门提供完善而科学的管理。因此,可以通过GIS来进行电子信息管理。文中就如何设计出基于GIS的工商管理信息系统进行了讨论。     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.     

信息化水平对生产率的直接效应和间接效应——劳动力技能结构的中介作用

构建了关于信息化水平、劳动力技能结构以及生产率的理论框架,探讨了信息化水平对生产率的直接和间接影响,以及劳动力技能结构在其中的中介作用,并利用中国省际面板数据对理论框架进行验证。结果表明:信息化水平对生产率同时具有直接影响和间接影响;信息化水平对生产率的直接影响呈现出动态的阶段性特征,两者之间存在U形关系,信息技术对生产率的促进作用只有在信息化水平达到一定程度后才能显现;信息化水平对生产率的间接影响通过劳动力技能结构的中介作用来实现:信息化水平的提升对低技能劳动者有明显的挤出效应,并带来了中、高技能劳动力需求上升,导致劳动力技能结构升级,从而促进劳动生产率以及资本生产率的提高;劳动力技能结构在信息化水平与全要素生产率之间的中介作用不显著。要使信息化更好地发挥作用,必须匹配较高水平的人力资本,劳动者需要进行持续学习与提升,以适应不断变化的社会需求。     

Education Dashboards for Enhanced Learning: A Singapore Experience

Educators continue to utilize add-ons, extensions, or replacements to traditional Learning Management Systems (LMSs) to supplement capabilities and improve the classroom experience. This work resulted in the design and development of the Education Dashboards for Enhanced Learning (EDEL) template. The EDEL template enables faculty members to create dynamic web spaces called Knowledge Portals (KPortals). A semester-long introduction of KPortals proved to be positive and useful. Students tended to view the KPortal as a “go-to” webspace. The authors hope to refine the template in future studies and examine its usefulness in other countries.     

区域科技基础条件平台构建研究

区域科技基础条件平台的构建，可以更好的发挥公共科技服务在区域自主创新和科技进步中的作用，有利于减少科技资源布局分散和重复建设等问题，将为区域主导产业的发展起到极大的促进作用，可以确保产业在全国同行业中处于领先地位。本文在解析了区域科技基础条件平台建设影响因素的基础上，分析区域科技基础条件平台构建的目标任务和重点工作内容，并探讨相关的保障措施。     

公共信用信息归集和使用的地方规则比较研究

公共信用信息的归集和使用是当前各地方政府社会信用体系建设的焦点问题。少数省、市在公共信用信息归集和使用规则制定上的经验值得借鉴。对江苏省和陕西省、杭州市和上海市的公共信用信息归集和使用的地方规则进行比较,从公共信用信息归集、使用、异议处理、管理机制几个方面进行总结并提出建议。     

现代信息服务业发展模式的比较与选择——基于广东省的数据分析

比较要素导向型、投资导向型和创新导向型三种现代信息服务业的发展模式,分析广东省现代信息服务业的发展现状,提出广东省现代信息服务业选择创新导向型发展模式的具体对策。     

从绿诺国际财务事件看海外借壳上市公司的会计和审计问题

借壳上市是中国公司海外上市的一种方式,然而近年来中国公司频频出现的财务问题引发了SEC对中国赴美借壳上市公司展开大规模调查。文章结合绿诺公司财务事件对中国公司海外借壳上市过程中出现的会计和审计问题进行了探讨,并分别从上市公司和监管机构的层面提出了相应建议。     

Bribery,corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar

Corruption has been found to be the most severe obstacle to business operations, according to a recent survey of over 3000 firms in Myanmar. This paper sets out to understand the structure of corruption through an econometric analysis of this survey. It finds that firms with higher ‘ability to pay’ (proxied by sales revenue and employee growth) are more likely to pay bribes. While firms with lower ‘refusal power’ (i.e. those dependent on bureaucratic permissions to export and import) are more likely to find corruption to be an obstacle. A distinct but related question is whether bribes act as ‘efficiency grease’ by allowing firms to circumvent red tape. No evidence is found to support this hypothesis; in fact, firms that pay bribes report greater bureaucratic hassle compared to firms that do not. This result fits in more closely with the view that red tape could be used to extract bribes from firms.