Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

环境信息披露与企业经营绩效——基于投资者关注的中介效应检验

经济高质量发展背景下,企业环境信息披露已经引起全社会的普遍重视。本文基于沪深A股上市公司2007—2019年样本企业面板数据,以投资者关注为中介变量,揭示环境信息披露对企业经营绩效的作用机制。结果显示,环境信息披露对企业经营绩效具有显著的正向激励作用,投资者关注发挥部分中介效用。进一步的研究表明,将机构投资者持股比例作为门槛变量时,存在显著的单一门槛效应,当企业引入机构投资者持股比例高于一定门槛值时,环境信息披露能显著提升企业经营绩效,否则激励效果不显著;同时异质性分析发现,重污染行业及2015年后环境信息披露对企业经营绩效激励效果更为显著。本文研究结论有助于企业更理性地认识环境信息披露的经济效益,为政府、企业和投资者共同构建高质量环境信息披露体系提供思路。     

企业制度变革中的博弈与均衡——一个关于国有企业民营化的实证研究

企业制度运行以利益相关者之间的共有理念为心理依托；这种共有理念体现在人们博弈均衡之中，是人们行为选择的默认前提，其形成和发展具有不以个人意志为转移的客观规律；企业制度变革的任务，是通过企业利益相关者之间的博弈和信任，在适应和调整共有理念的基础上，塑造合理的企业控制权主体。     

对机构投资者、独立董事制度与公司治理的思考

在我国资本市场上,“一股独大”股权结构所引发的控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题成为公司治理的核心。在股权结构不合理的环境下,独立董事的有效性难以发挥。引入机构投资者使其与大股东抗衡,可以让独立董事真正独立。通过分析独立董事有效性以及机构投资者对公司治理的影响,可以探讨引入机构投资者对独立董事制度的影响,结合独立董事制度与机构投资者,可以提出解决公司治理核心问题的方法。     

政治关系“力量”与民营企业价值研究:腐败的调节效应

从社会网络理论的强弱关系视角对2012-2014年福布斯中国富豪榜的企业家及其企业进行了政治关系的度量,检验了腐败是否会调节政治关系力量对企业价值的影响。研究发现,企业家本身所具有的政治关系对企业价值具有明显的正向影响作用,关系的力量越强,对企业价值的正向影响就越大;与此同时,腐败的出现会强化政治关系力量对民营企业价值的影响。通过分组验证发现,这种力量在腐败程度较高环境下更易对企业价值产生正向影响,但在腐败程度较低的环境中,政治关系对民营企业价值的影响很多时候并不显著。     

PPP项目控制权本质探讨

控制权是PPP项目合作的重要理论前提,同时也是实践中亟待解决的关键问题之一。研究基于控制权理论,在剖析权力及企业控制权的基础上,深入探讨了PPP项目控制权的本质;认为PPP项目控制权是建立在资源基础上的企业控制权,包括实质控制权和剩余控制权,它们构成影响公私合作效率的基础。由于控制权结构不同,因此,它既是公私合作的选择形式,也是合作主体的权利与义务的条件。     

新审计报告与资本市场的信息反应——来自股价同步性和股价预测能力双维度的经验证据

新审计报告准则的施行旨在增加审计报告的信息含量及其决策相关性。以2015—2018年沪深非金融上市公司为样本,研究发现新审计报告施行后,上市公司的股价同步性显著下降,公司特质信息含量比例显著上升,股价特质信息效率显著提升,同时新审计报告的施行产生了增量信息。在此基础上,进一步分析新审计报告准则对资本市场特质信息效率的传导机制,发现投资者关注度对新审计报告(关键审计事项的披露数量)影响资本市场特质信息效率的过程中表现出显著的部分中介效应。分样本检验的结果表明,虽然AH股共同上市公司和非AH股共同上市公司之间的结果存在细微差异但整体趋势相似。通过对新审计报告的影响的分析,可以更好地理解该政策对资本市场的影响。     

The effects of corporate environmental disclosure on environmental innovation from stakeholder perspectives

Based on legitimacy theory and resource dependence theory, using 111 listed companies among China’s typically high pollution-emitting listed corporations, research into the effects of environmental disclosure on environmental innovation is undertaken. From the perspective of stakeholders, we analyse the moderating effects of different proportions of institutional investor holdings and types of enterprises on the relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental innovation. The results indicate that corporate environmental disclosure has a positive role in promoting environmental innovation; the proportion of institutional investor holdings has a positive moderating effect between environmental disclosure and environmental innovation. However, there is no significant difference between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in terms of the effect of the environmental disclosure on environmental innovation, which possibly arises because both types of enterprises make full use of their own advantages to instigate environmental innovation through environmental disclosure. The conclusions may help enterprise decision-makers implementing environmental innovation and government policy makers formulating scientific policies to promote the clean production in enterprises.     

Coordinating China's economic growth strategy via its government-controlled association for private firms

Scholars in economics and political science argue that one major function of government is to overcome coordination failure in economic development, especially during times of rapid environmental changes. But, how and through what means does the state coordinate firms to follow the changing directions of its economic objectives? This paper focuses on the case of a government-controlled business association, namely the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), and shows that the ACFIC may be serving, at least partially, as a means of avoiding the kind of coordination failures that are often associated with policy reform programs in authoritarian regimes like China when the government deems it necessary to radically and suddenly change its policy objectives. It does so by comparing the activities of firms that are members of ACFIC with non-members before and after the world financial crisis of 2008–09 which induced a significant change in government objectives. Before that crisis when priority in government objectives was “outward” (to stave off balance of payments crises that had befallen many other developing countries), ACFIC member firms were able to engage in exports and foreign investment to a greater extent than non-member firms, and even than those whose owners are members of the Congresses or Chinese Communist Party. After viewing the crises in international markets, and government objectives had turned more “inward”, ACFIC members were more likely to focus on domestic sales and investments.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.