基于内部监督及社会惩罚机制的中小企业团体贷款还款研究

论文在Besley和Coate的团体贷款经典模型基础上,从社会资本视角,将内部监督、社会惩罚及企业产出相互关系三个重要维度纳入综合分析模型,基于此综合模型讨论了可能影响团体贷款还款博弈的各因素的相互作用效果,较为系统地分析了中小企业团体贷款的还款问题,探讨了如何防止由于借贷双方信息不对称引起的策略性违约。     

惩罚对犯罪的威慑效应：基于中国数据的实证研究

通过构建破案率、逮捕率、起诉率和重刑率四个指标来衡量惩罚的确定性和严厉性,借此研究惩罚对犯罪的威慑效应。实证结果发现,无论是惩罚的确定性还是严厉性均对总犯罪率、财产犯罪和暴力犯罪产生了显著的威慑作用。其中破案率的威慑力最强。而无论惩罚的确定性还是严厉性对暴力犯罪的威慑作用均小于财产犯罪。这些结论对治理犯罪及刑事政策的完善都颇具启示意义。     

论行政处罚法设定公民基本权利的宪法依据

行政处罚法作为一部行政法律是为了解决公权力与私权利的冲突和平衡的矛盾.在这一过程中,行政处罚法对公民基本权利的创设、行使起到了关键作用.鉴于行政法律与宪法的密切关系,从<行政处罚法>对公民基本权利的论述到设定的宪法法理这一线索出发,对<行政处罚法>设定公民基本权利的宪法依据进行完整的分析.     

法秩序统一视角下虚开案件行刑认定冲突与协调

虚开案件的违法行为以虚开行为和非法抵扣行为为核心,受税法和刑法的共同规制。实践中一些虚开案件在刑事司法中因抵扣行为未使国家税款受损不构成犯罪,而在行政执法中被认定为偷税,引发行刑认定冲突。税收违法行为的共通本质在于对法益的侵害,法益是虚开案件行刑认定的联结纽带。偷税罚和虚开增值税专用发票罪均以保护国家税款利益为共同法益,只是刑法在逃税罪之外,对利用虚开增值税专用发票造成国家税款损失的违法手段作特殊评价,而税法包含在偷税罚中。虚开增值税专用发票罪与偷税罚具有相同的构成要件要素,均可涵摄非法抵扣行为和国家税款损失结果。因此,两法域对非法抵扣行为造成的国家增值税款损失的认定应保持一致,综合增值税全链条作实质判断,禁止形式推定,从而区分“脱税罚”和“秩序罚”,以实现过罚相当。     

超越比例原则： 同态报应量刑原则的法理根基与实践意义

德国公法中的比例原则并不是刑罚的内在道德原则,而是外在于罪刑均衡的补充性政治原则。在预防性刑法时代,单凭比例原则无法对预防刑的扩张风险形成有效约束,而带有形而上学色彩的“点”或“幅”量刑限制理论都不具有现实可操作性。回归同态报应原则是捍卫古典罪刑均衡理念、防止重刑化趋势的可操作方案,实质是从“量”的思维转向“质”的思维。以同态报应作为量刑原则,不需要预设不合理的刑罚证成理论,也不必然导致不人道或无法操作的刑罚方式。同态报应的本质是罪犯角色的转换,将罪犯从试图脱离法秩序的优势地位转为受到法律强制力约束的弱势地位,从而否定罪犯的不法宣称,恢复法秩序的公信力。根据同态报应原则,社区矫正可以被视作一种具有普遍意义的典型刑罚,而不仅仅是对监禁刑的边缘补充。     

A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance for the experimental outcome.

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生育对女性收入的影响研究

本文基于中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS2016)数据,全面考察子女数量对女性收入的因果效应.根据研究显示,中国实施"二孩政策"之后,女性的生育意愿提高,女性如多生育一个孩子,收入会显著降低14.1％,而生育对男性的收入没有显著影响.如果"二孩政策"的实施达到预期的政策目标,那么女性的收入很可能随生育率的提高而下降,从而扩大...     

Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings

The rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer-generated ratings. This paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings. By manipulating payoffs and effectively “deactivating” either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market, raters' behavior is decomposed into buyer-centric and seller-centric components. The cost of providing a rating also plays a major role in influencing rating behavior, with high and low quality sellers being rated more often than those of moderate quality.     

Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced. JEL Classification C91 · C73 · C41 · D71     

Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?

This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2016. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of recognition and disclosure fraud viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due not least to information leakage.